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PROMOTING RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION
THROUGH THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: ARE QUI
TAM ACTIONS A VIABLE METHOD OF
ENFORCING “AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING
FAIR HOUSING” VIOLATIONS?
Matthew J. Termine*
This Note uses United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro
New York, Inc. v. Westchester County as an entry point into a discussion
of residential segregation, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and enforcement of
the FHA’s desegregation provision—the “Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing” (AFFH) duties. This Note explains why the Anti-Discrimination
Center selected a qui tam action via the Federal False Claims Act to
enforce Westchester’s duties. After highlighting the inadequacies of the
FHA enforcement scheme, this Note explores the viability of qui tam as a
solution.
Two issues are central to determining whether qui tam is a viable
solution. First, a circuit split concerning the admissibility of information
garnered through Freedom of Information Act requests in qui tam actions
threatens to prevent national adoption of Anti-Discrimination Center-type
actions. Second, this Note places qui tam enforcement of AFFH duties
within the context of “public law” litigation and analyzes where such
actions stand relative to commentators’ criticism and support for “public
law” litigation. This Note concludes that the circuit split should be
resolved in favor of admitting Freedom of Information Act evidence and
that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions have the potential to
withstand some common pitfalls observed in traditional “public law”
litigation.
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INTRODUCTION: UNITED STATES EX REL. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CENTER OF
METRO NEW YORK, INC. V. WESTCHESTER COUNTY
In August 2009, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York (the
Center), together with the U.S. Department of Justice, won an extraordinary
$62.5 million settlement in a residential desegregation case against
Westchester County, New York (Westchester).1 The size of the settlement,
which represented seven years of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development2 (HUD) funding to Westchester, was not the only
extraordinary characteristic. The way in which the Center initiated the
litigation was also extraordinary and the creativity required to improve

1. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cnty., No. 06-cv-2860-DLC, slip op. at 37 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009) (approving the
settlement reached between the United States, the Anti-Discrimination Center (the Center)
and Westchester County (Westchester)); Press Release, Anti-Discrimination Center., Inc. of
Metro New York, Anti-Discrimination Center Wins Unprecedented $62.5 Million
Settlement In Housing De-Segregation Case Against Westchester County (Aug. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/ADCrelease20090810.pdf
[hereinafter Anti-Discrimination Center Press Release].
2. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was created as a
cabinet-level executive agency through the enactment of the Department of Housing
Development Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3532–3533 (2006) (establishing HUD, describing
the general duties of the Secretary of HUD and establishing posts for eight assistant
secretaries, general counsel, and declaring that each officer of HUD shall be appointed by
the President); see Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/about/mission (last visited Nov. 11, 2010)
(“HUD’s mission is to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality
affordable homes for all.”). In fiscal year 2009, HUD’s budget was $41.833 Billion. U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY 2010 BUDGET: ROAD MAP FOR TRANSFORMATION 2–3
(2009) [hereinafter HUD’S FY 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL]. The vast majority of this money
was distributed through five categories of programs: tenant-based rental assistance (38% of
budget); project-based rental assistance (17%); the Public Housing Operating Fund (11%);
Community Development Block Grants (9%); and Homeless Assistance Grants (4%). See id.
(stating HUD’s total budget and individual program spending).
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conditions in Westchester highlighted one of the many legal hurdles
Westchester faced in advancing residential integration.3
In United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York v.
Westchester County,4 the Center used a novel approach, asserting the
ancient qui tam action5 by way of the Federal False Claims Act (FCA).6
The liability theory took advantage of a complicated fund-granting
mechanism used by HUD that requires all HUD grantees such as
Westchester County to certify that they are in compliance with the Fair
Housing Act (FHA).7 The fund-granting mechanism requires grantees to
undertake a very specific analysis of the grantee’s community, an Analysis
of Impediments, to determine what “impediments to fair housing choice”
exist and explain how the federal funds will be used to overcome the
impediments.8 Among the particular requirements of this analysis is a
HUD mandate that grantees analyze and consider racial impediments such
as the concentration of minority groups.9 Underlying HUD’s fund-granting
mechanism is a desire on the part of HUD to fulfill its statutory duty under

3. Two more conventional approaches to housing desegregation litigation are: (1)
alleging that HUD itself has failed to comply with a provision of the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) or (2) alleging intentional discrimination on the part of local officials. See Thompson
v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 524 (D. Md. 2005) (holding
HUD liable for locating housing projects within heavily segregated Baltimore City and
failing to consider locations in surrounding communities); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (holding the Chicago Housing Authority liable
for a “deliberate policy to separate the races”).
4. No. 06 Civ. 02860 (DLC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009).
5. Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in
hac parte sequitur, which translates to: “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this
matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009). A qui tam action is defined as an
“action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which
the government or some specified public institution will receive.” Id.; see also United States
ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 738 (3d Cir. 1997) (defining qui tam as
when a “private person with knowledge of fraud against the government, acting as a de facto
‘attorney general,’ [instigates] litigation on the government’s behalf against the parties
responsible”).
6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. Recently, the False Claims Act (FCA) has been in the
headlines in connection with the UBS tax evasion scandal. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning,
Banker Aims at Billions for Blowing the Whistle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at B1. Bradley
C. Birkenfield, a former private banker at UBS, the Swiss bank, tipped federal authorities off
to business practices that allowed wealthy Americans to hide billions of dollars overseas. Id.
Although Birkenfield was implicated in the scheme and sentenced to forty months in federal
prison, his attorneys have alleged a claim to “several billion dollars” of the recovery via the
FCA. Id.
7. 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a) (2010) (requiring “certifications, satisfactory to HUD, [to be]
included in the [grantee’s] annual submission to HUD”).
8. Id. § 91.225(a)(1) (requiring each jurisdiction to “submit a certification that it will
affirmatively further fair housing, which means that it will conduct an analysis to identify
impediments to fair housing choice within the jurisdiction [and] take appropriate actions to
overcome the effects of any impediments identified”).
9. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE 2–8
[hereinafter FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE] (defining impediments to fair housing choice
as “any actions, omissions, or decisions which have the effect of restricting housing choices
or the availability of housing choices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, disability,
familial status, or national origin.” (emphasis added)).
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the FHA to “affirmatively . . . further” fair housing (AFFH)10 and facilitate
the grantee’s fulfillment of their independent statutory duty to AFFH.11
The certification process minimizes potential HUD liability because HUD
only grants funds when grantees have affirmatively certified that they are in
compliance with the FHA.12 Furthermore, it overlays the grantee’s
independent AFFH duty with a contractual assertion that is subject to FCA
actions such as the qui tam action initiated by the Center.13
The Center succeeded in its action against Westchester, but the question
remains: Why did the Center rely on the particularities of HUD’s fundgranting mechanism and commence such a complex and costly14 qui tam
litigation against Westchester? Contrary to lawyerly intuition, the Center
did not select the qui tam action because it was the most advantageous of
various theories of liability that it could have used against Westchester.15
In fact, as this Note will explain, the qui tam action might have been the
only theory of liability available to a private party, such as the Center,
challenging Westchester’s actions.16 The FHA’s enforcement scheme does
not include a direct cause of action against HUD grantees for failure to
comply with AFFH duties, and this Note suggests that a causal link may
exist between this deficiency and the persistency of residential segregation
in the United States.
Over forty years after the passage of the FHA, our cities and suburbs
remain highly segregated.17 Although alarming, this finding should not be
10. Throughout this Note, “AFFH” will be used to refer to the FHA requirement that all
federal funds be used “affirmatively to further” fair housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (stating that “[a]ll executive departments and agencies shall
administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development . . . in a
manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter” (emphasis added)); FAIR
HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at 1–2 (defining “affirmatively furthering fair
housing” as a requirement that grantees (1) conduct an analysis to identify impediments to
fair housing choice within the jurisdiction; (2) take appropriate actions to overcome the
effects of any impediments identified through the analysis; and (3) maintain records
“reflecting the analysis and actions taken in this regard”).
12. Cf. Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1984)
(explaining that one of HUD’s main sources of pressure is withholding funds to HUD
grantees for noncompliance).
13. See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that “[i]n order to
state a claim premised on a ‘legally false’ certification theory, the defendant must have
certified compliance with a statute or regulation ‘as a condition to governmental payment’”
(citations omitted)).
14. See Nat’l Comm’n on Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 4 (Sept. 22,
2008) (testimony of Michael Allen) (noting that the qui tam litigation technique used by the
Center is “expensive”).
15. See id. (recommending that Congress “[m]ake the AFFH obligation enforceable by
private parties (including fair housing and other community groups) who are knowledgeable
about impediments to fair housing and about appropriate actions to overcome those
impediments”).
16. Id.
17. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY RACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 67 (Sept. 1998), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/ca/pdfs/ca.pdf
[hereinafter INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING] (reporting that non-
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completely unexpected. The FHA was enacted 102 years after the
Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery. During this century-long period,
housing discrimination was widespread in the private sector as well as in
local and national government.18 By the time the FHA was enacted in
1968, much of the damage had already been done; the freight train of
residential segregation had been put into motion and only decisive
affirmative action could reverse its course.19 To combat this, the FHA
focuses its efforts on prohibiting discrimination in housing markets—as
complemented by a formal enforcement scheme.20 However, the FHA’s
only true desegregative tool—the AFFH provision—attached to all federal
money channeled through HUD is not afforded a statutory enforcement
scheme.21 As one of the only desegregation tools available to parties such
as the Center, it is important to determine whether the qui tam action is a
viable alternative to a formal enforcement scheme within the FHA.
This Note uses Anti-Discrimination Center as an entry point into a
discussion of residential segregation, the FHA, and enforcement of the
FHA’s desegregation provision—the AFFH duties. This Note attempts to
explain why the Center used the qui tam action and what this tells us about
the inadequacies of the FHA enforcement scheme. Pointing to the potential
inadequacies, this Note explores the viability of qui tam as a solution. Two
issues, the first practical and the second theoretical, are central to the qui
tam viability discussion. The first issue is the relevance of the circuit split
at the heart of Westchester’s motion to dismiss to future Anti-

Hispanic blacks, on average, live in neighborhoods composed of less than 30% percent nonHispanic whites even though non-Hispanic whites make up almost 75% of the overall
population); PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, BROOKINGS INST., STUNNING PROGRESS, HIDDEN
PROBLEMS: THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 1990S 5 fig.2 (May
2003) (reporting that nearly three out of four people living in neighborhoods of high
concentrations of poverty were black or Latino).
18. See CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 64 (2005) (noting that George Romney’s Operation
Breakthrough faced “towering obstacles to suburban integration” such as exclusionary
zoning measures); Guido Calabresi, Preface to THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY
YEARS 7 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) (noting that the FHA and Veteran’s Association
mortgage assistance programs “until the late 1950s explicitly rejected the development of
integrated communities”).
19. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 63–64 tbl.3.1 (1993) (noting that the average northern
city had a black-white dissimilarity of 84.5% in 1970—meaning that over 84% of blacks
“would have to move to achieve an even, or ‘integrated,’ residential configuration”).
20. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting
that the FHA was “designed primarily to prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, financing,
or brokerage of private housing and to provide federal enforcement procedures for
remedying such discrimination”).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006) (defining “discriminatory housing practice” as “an
act that is unlawful” under § 3604 (discrimination in the sale or rental of housing), § 3605
(discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions), § 3606 (discrimination in the
provision of brokerage services) or § 3617 (interference, coercion, or intimidation), but not
including failure to comply with § 3608(e)(5)).
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Discrimination Center-type actions.22 Second, this Note places use of qui
tam to enforce AFFH duties within the context of “public law” litigation
and determines where it stands relative to support for, and criticism of,
“public law” litigation.
Part I places Anti-Discrimination Center in historical context and
describes the legislative history of both the FHA and the FCA. Part II
presents a circuit split over whether qui tam actions based on state or
municipal “administrative reports” are barred by the FCA’s public
disclosure. Part III concludes that state or municipal reports should not be
barred because admission of such reports is consistent with the purpose of
the FCA. Part IV places Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions within the
paradigm of “public law” litigation and discusses some advantages and
disadvantages of using qui tam as an enforcement mechanism. Part V
concludes that qui tam has potential as an enforcement mechanism of the
FHA’s desegregation provision.
I. SEGREGATION, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, AND QUI TAM ACTIONS
Part I places Anti-Discrimination Center in historical context and
describes the legislative history of both the FHA and the FCA. Part I.A
explains the societal forces behind residential segregation and introduces
theories as to why residential segregation is difficult to eradicate.
Part I.B turns to the enactment of the FHA. A brief legislative history of
the FHA is presented that attempts to distinguish between the intentions of
Congress as a whole and the intentions of the framers of the FHA. Turning
to federal court interpretations of the FHA, this Note focuses on the AFFH
duties of § 3608(e)(5). This part compares the enforcement mechanism
supporting the anti-discrimination provisions with the enforcement
provisions of § 3608(e)(5) and highlights the inability of parties such as the
Center to bring direct actions against HUD grantees.
Part I.C explains HUD’s Community Development Block Grant program
with the aim of detailing the types of missteps that lead to AntiDiscrimination Center-type grantee liability. The process of analyzing
impediments to fair housing is explained and connected to the enforcement
of the AFFH duties. Part I.C.3 turns to the efficacy of relying on HUD to
enforce AFFH duties and points out potential problems with the
enforcement scheme. Part I.C also introduces benefits and disadvantages of
overlaying the HUD enforcement scheme with “public law” litigation
enforcement.
Part I.D connects the FCA and qui tam actions to residential
desegregation litigation. A brief history of the FCA is offered in Part I.D.1.
Part I.D.2 then turns to the inner workings of the modern FCA and the
public disclosure bar which limits parasitic actions “based on” publicly
available information.
22. Throughout this Note, “Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions” will refer to a
private party’s use of the qui tam provisions of the FCA to enforce HUD grantees’ AFFH
obligations.
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Part I.E concludes Part I with a discussion of the paradigm of “public
law” litigation,23 with the hope of understanding where the AntiDiscrimination Center action stands in relation to other private actions
enforcing “public laws.” This concept is originally presented by the late
Harvard Law School Professor Abram Chayes, in his piece, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation,24 Chayes detailed the distinction between
traditional litigation that is a “vehicle for settling disputes between private
parties about private rights”25 and “public law litigation,” which is a mode
of litigation that uses the courts to foster social change.26 This section sets
up the framework to judge the viability of using Anti-Discrimination
Center-type actions to enforce AFFH obligations.
A. The Complicated Problem of Residential Segregation
Understanding the chronological development of residential segregation
will aid in the discussion of whether the qui tam action is a viable method
of enforcing the AFFH duties and solving the problem of residential
segregation. Part I.A.1 introduces residential segregation as an artificial
phenomenon rooted in our country’s long history of individual and
institutional discrimination. The evolution of segregation forces is tracked
between the Civil War and Civil Rights Era. Part I.A.2 confronts the
proposition that segregation has persisted in the face of extensive civil
rights reform including explicit prohibitions of discrimination in the
housing markets. Two theories are presented that elucidate the complexity
of modern day residential segregation. The first theory attempts to explain
how barely-measureable racial preferences can lead to staggeringly
segregated residential neighborhoods. The second theory presents a unique
characteristic of neighborhood selection and shows how an uneven income
distribution amongst the races can have a drastic impact on residential
segregation outcomes. The complexity of the segregation problem, as
depicted through the two theories in Part I.A.2, are relevant to the
discussion of the viability of Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions in
Parts II and III.
1. Artificial Beginning
When residential segregation is viewed as a late-blooming offshoot of the
institution of slavery, the artificial and insidious nature of racial isolation

23. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (listing the “characteristic features of the public law model” as: (1) a
“party structure [that is] sprawling and amorphous”; (2) “traditional adversary relationship
[that] is suffused and intermixed with negotiating and mediating”; and (3) a “trial judge [who
is] the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread
effects on persons not before the court,” but noting that different fields “display in varying
degrees the features of public law litigation”).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1282.
26. Id. at 1281–82.
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shines through.27 The early origins can be traced back to a ghetto-creating
trifecta: (1) the economic status of African Americans in the late nineteenth
century, (2) the high concentration of African Americans in southern states
at that time, and (3) the rapid urbanization of northern cities during the
industrial revolution.28
In 1870, eighty percent of all blacks lived in the rural south.29 Housing
in the South was largely integrated—a fact attributable to the preceding
years of slavery and the practice of housing slaves close to their master’s
compound.30 Despite their integration, southern African Americans lived in
White
“appalling poverty relative to their white counterparts.”31
southerners took advantage of the vulnerable position of blacks by binding
them in sharecropping contracts that strongly favored the white landowners
and merchants.32 Black codes33 reinforced the master-slave dichotomy and
maintained the status quo: economic subordination of the newly freed
slaves.34 This concentration of economically disadvantaged blacks set the
stage for an industrial revolution-induced black migration to cities and the
creation of segregated urban ghettos. 35
27. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 19 (“The emergence of the black ghetto
did not happen as a chance by-product of other socioeconomic processes.”); REPORT OF THE
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMM’N
REPORT] (“[W]hite society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it,
white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”); C. Michael Henry,
Introduction: Historical Overview of Race and Poverty from Reconstruction to 1969, in
RACE, POVERTY AND DOMESTIC POLICY 1, 7 (C. Michael Henry ed., 2004) (describing “the
problems of race and poverty [as] a significant part of the damning legacies of slavery”);
Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation
and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 803 (1996) (arguing that “segregation was
not a normal or natural part” of the growth experienced by northern cities and a “host of
private, public, and governmental actors deliberately created residential segregation”).
28. See infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text.
29. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 18.
30. See id. at 25 (noting that in the South, “African Americans were scattered widely
among urban neighborhoods and were more likely to share neighborhoods with whites than
with members of their own group”). This practice was designed, in part, “to prevent the
formation of a cohesive African American Society.” Id. at 24. However, southern residential
segregation increased during the antebellum period as former slaves moved away from their
master’s compound. See STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT
DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 14–15 (2000)
(describing segregation in the South during the antebellum period).
31. Henry, supra note 27, at 1.
32. Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Debt Peonage in the Cotton South After the
Civil War, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 641, 655 (1972) (noting the weak position of the indebted
tenants relative to the landlord).
33. John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 869 (1966) (describing the “Black
Codes” as laws “which severely restricted [African Americans] in the enjoyment of rights
which the law affirmatively protected for . . . white citizen[s]” and prejudiced African
Americans “in such areas of life and commerce as purchase of realty, equality of criminal
penalties and proceedings, trade or business”).
34. KIRT H. WILSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION DESEGREGATION DEBATE: THE POLITICS OF
EQUALITY AND THE RHETORIC OF PLACE, 1870–1875, at 13 (2002) (noting that “[t]he North
might call the former slaves ‘freedmen,’ [while] South Carolina law . . . maintain[ed] the
caste system that defined ‘servants’ in very different terms than their ‘masters’”).
35. Id.
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In the years following the January 1863 implementation of the
Emancipation Proclamation,36 growing numbers of African Americans
moved to northern and midwestern cities.37 Race relations in the North
remained, for the most part, stable and only modest levels of residential
segregation existed.38 Sociologists and historians note the development of a
class of elite African American professionals that served white clients as
lawyers and doctors.39 By 1916, the migration40 achieved an increased
intensity as the military-industrial build-up to World War I drew more than
500,000 African Americans over the next three years from the rural south to
northern and midwestern cities.41 This influx had a dramatic effect on race
relations and “[n]orthern whites viewed this rising tide of black migration
with increasing hostility and considerable alarm.”42 An upsurge in racial
violence and a decrease in white willingness to interact and transact
business with African Americans virtually eliminated the existence of the
class of elite African American professionals, creating an increasingly
exclusionary environment for newly arrived African American citydwellers.43 The seeds of tense race relations were planted by the 1960s,
when another 1.38 million blacks left the South for northern cities.44
White northerner’s decreased willingness to interact with blacks
amplified the effect of institutional structures, further entrenching the
segregation of the races. Racially restrictive covenants—provisions written
into property deeds preventing the transfer of property to certain races—
were used throughout the Great Migration.45 Despite the 1948 invalidation
of racially restrictive covenants,46 for the next twenty years the covenants
36. 12 Stat. 1268 (1863) (declaring, through two executive orders, that those slaves of
the Confederate States of America not returning to Union control by January 1, 1863 were
free).
37. See CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 27 (2005) (noting only 400,000 African Americans left
the South in the 1930s followed by nearly 1.5 million in the 1940s and again in the 1960s);
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 27–29 (noting that the “outflow” of African
Americans was only 70,000 during the 1870s and 80,000 during the 1880s compared to
877,000 in the 1920s); MEYER, supra note 30, at 30.
38. See MEYER, supra note 30, at 13.
39. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 22, 23 (describing the small but highly
successful black elite class in Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee).
40. See Karl Taeuber, Causes of Residential Segregation, in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
AFTER TWENTY YEARS 33, 34 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) (referring to the migration of
southern African Americans to northern and midwestern cities as the “great migration”).
41. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 29
42. Id.
43. Id. at 34 (noting that the “initial impetus for ghetto formation came from a wave of
racial violence . . . that swept over northern cities in the period between 1900 and 1920”).
44. REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE
IN AMERICA 113 (1987).
45. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR
HOUSING 7 (2008) (noting that “deeds in nearly every new housing development in the North
prevented the use or ownership of homes by anyone other than the Caucasian race” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that the states “in granting
judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements . . . have denied petitioners the equal
protection of the laws [and] therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand”). The FHA
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continued to be incorporated into deeds as unenforceable but “valuable
signals for current and would-be property owners in covenanted
neighborhoods.”47 Blockbusting, a “real estate practice[] in which brokers
encourage[d] owners to list their homes for sale by exploiting fears of racial
change within [the owner’s] neighborhood,” was commonplace between the
late 1950s and late 1960s.48 The Federal Housing Administration, the
federal government mortgage lending arm, disseminated guidelines to field
offices that called for protection of neighborhoods from the “infiltration of
inharmonious racial groups.”49 Attitudes of white northerners and
institutional actions provided more than sufficient staying power, but these
triggered yet another segregation force: white flight.50 As racial tension
increased and institutional players pushed whites and blacks into, and then
out of, city neighborhoods, whites, with the requisite mobility, eventually
fled to the suburbs.51 These forces set the stage for an internalization of
residential segregation’s staying power.52 By the time Congress and the
courts prohibited discriminatory individual and institutional action in the
housing markets, segregation’s internal staying power had taken hold.53

distributed materials recommending the use of racially restrictive covenants even after the
Shelley decision. See, e.g., FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING
AND VALUATION PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT 323 (1936)
(recommending the use of neighborhood demographics to predict housing valuations);
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 208 (1985) (commenting that the materials recommending the racially restrictive
covenants were used after Shelley).
47. See Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a Desegregated
Society?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 58 (1992) (noting anecdotally that a house the author
purchased in Michigan had a restrictive covenant running in its deed through the 1950s until
the 1960s); Richard R. W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions 12 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-8, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=353723 (arguing that the impact of covenants did not vanish
after the Supreme Court ruled their enforcement unconstitutional).
48. Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1998); see Taeuber, supra note
40, at 35 (describing the practice of blockbusting).
49. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 46, at 323 (“The infiltration of inharmonious racial
groups will produce the same effects as those which follow the introduction of
nonconforming land uses which tend to lower the levels of land values and to lessen the
desirability of residential areas.”)
50. KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 12–13 (stating that the second of two
related social movements that were causally connected to residential segregation was the
departure of urban whites from Northern cities to suburban enclaves).
51. Cf. Steven E. Asher, Interdistrict Remedies for Segregated Schools, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1168, 1181 (1979) (noting that institutional players such as the FHA-instituted policies
that encouraged white flight from the cities).
52. See infra Part I.A.2 (introducing two theories that may explain the internalization of
residential segregation’s staying power).
53. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 427 (6th ed. 2008) (stating
that “nearly one third of the African-American population reside in blocks that are more than
90 percent black, and nearly half of the white population live on blocks that are more than 90
percent white”); MASSEY & DENTON supra note 19, at 48 tbl.2.4 (stating that the isolation
index, which measures the extent to which blacks live within neighborhoods that are
predominantly black, increased in Northern cities from 31.7 in 1930 to 73.5 in 1970).
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2. Sophisticated Staying Power
The relationship between individual choice and aggregate results is
central to the discussion of the internal staying power of residential
segregation. Every time an individual moves into or out of a neighborhood,
there is a situation in which individual choice impacts the composition of
both neighborhoods the individual is both moving to and from.54 Nobel
Laureate and University of Maryland economics professor Thomas
Schelling55 posits that individual choices in the housing market can
transform small differences in groups’ attitudes about neighborhood
diversity into “strikingly polarized results.”56 The Schelling thesis causally
links “discriminatory individual behavior” to housing segregation, but
defines “discriminatory” as “an awareness, conscious or unconscious, of
sex or age or religion or color or whatever” that influences decisions on
where to live.57 This nuanced definition is at the heart of why Professor
Schelling’s model is relevant to assessing the efficacy of the FHA in
integrating our neighborhoods: the theory uncovers the mechanics behind
the observation that mere racial awareness perpetuates segregation.
In setting forth his thesis, Schelling uses so-called chessboard
experiments in which each chess piece represents a family of one race or
another.58 He further assumes residents: (1) are race conscious and (2)
have a mild racial preference (e.g., whites do not want to be out-numbered
more than two-to-one and vice versa).59 He begins with a mixed

54. HGTV, for example, is a television network developed around the search for suitable
living. See HGTV PROGRAM GUIDE, www.hgtv.com (follow “On TV” hyperlink; then follow
“Program Guide” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (listing “House Hunters,” “Income
Property,” “Property Virgins,” “My First Place,” among other house-selection related
shows).
55. Thomas Schelling won the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics along with Robert
Aumann “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through gametheory analysis.” The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel 2005, NOBEL FOUNDATION, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/
2005/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). Although much of Schelling’s work focused on gametheory, in the 1970s he leveraged his work in the area of individual decision-making to
analyze the aggregate effects of individual decisions. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 11–43 (1978).
56. W.A.V. Clark, Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Segregation: A Test of
the Schelling Segregation Model, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 15 (1991); see also Thomas C.
Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 PUB. INT. 61, 80–82 (1972) (arguing that
“processes of separation, segregation, sharing, mixing, dispersal . . . have a feature in
common. The consequences are aggregate but the decisions are exceedingly individual”);
Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 143, 144
(1971) [hereinafter Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation].
57. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, supra note 56, at 144; see also John
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro–The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 390 (1966) (“There exists a ‘tipping point’—a given
percentage of [African Americans], after which the departure of whites from the areas will
be greatly accelerated.”)
58. See Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, supra note 56, at 144.
59. See id.; Tim Harford, The Logic of Life: Racial Segregation and Thomas Schelling,
http://timharford.com/2009/03/the-logic-of-life-racial-segregation-and-thomas-schelling/
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neighborhood and, in the first round, moves any chess piece that is in a
neighborhood that fails to meet the family’s mild racial
preference to a neighborhood that does.60 He repeats this move again and
again.61 Eventually, the mild racial preference of not wanting to be outnumbered more than two-to-one in a given neighborhood creates a
This example shows that
completely segregated environment.62
“although . . . individuals may be rational and tolerant, the society we
produce together may be neither rational nor tolerant.”63
One somewhat unrealistic aspect of the Schelling thesis is that it assumes
there is perfect mobility between neighborhoods for all residents.64 The
distribution of economic resources between races is far from uniform and
this fortifies the staying power of segregation.65 The Tiebout Sorting,
developed by the late University of Washington economics professor,
Charles Tiebout,66 says that the mechanics of matching individual
preferences to public expenditure on the local level is vastly different from
the same on the national level.67 The basic problem on the national level is
that often there is a wide range of views on a given issue. As an example,
consider the amount of money the federal government decides to spend on
maintaining our national parks. Ultimately, the federal government’s
chosen level of expenditure matches only a sliver of the many individual
preferences.68 Professor Tiebout argues that this problem does not occur at
the local level because individuals are free to move in and out of
neighborhoods based on their local public expenditure preferences.69
Professor Tiebout views each town as offering a different menu of public
expenditure (e.g., high or low expenditure on schooling and maintenance of
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (presenting a visual demonstration of Schelling’s segregation
model).
60. See John Kaplan, supra note 57, at 390; Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation,
supra note 56, at 144.
61. See Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, supra note 56, at 144.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 144–45 (accounting for this deficiency and pointing out that this paper
might be positioned in “third place” behind institutional discrimination and the effect of
disparities in economic resources between the races).
65. See INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING supra note 17, at 35
(presenting the median family income for African Americans ($26,000), Hispanics
($26,000), whites ($47,000) and Asians ($49,000); noting that “Asian and non-Hispanic
white families have much higher median incomes than black or Hispanic families” and
“[t]he median income of black families as a percentage of non-Hispanic white median family
income was about the same in 1997 as in 1967, at less than 60 percent”).
66. Charles Tiebout revolutionized the way economists think about the free-rider
problem and spending choices made at the local level. See Peter H. Schuck, Judging
Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289,
303 (2002) (acknowledging the prominence of Tiebout’s theory).
67. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956) (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best
satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”).
68. HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 18–21 (Kenneth Joseph Arrow &
Amartya Sen eds., 2002) (explaining the overarching problem of selecting a level of
expenditure for a group with varied preferences for the level of spending).
69. Tiebout, supra note 67, at 418.
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city parks).70 Overlaying this theory with the uneven income distribution
between the races, the diversity in public expenditure from one town to the
next creates a situation where low-income earners inevitably select towns
with low public expenditure and correlative low tax rates.71 Together, the
theories from Professors Schelling and Tiebout help to explain how
segregation remains despite efforts to root out purposeful discrimination in
the housing market.
B. The Fair Housing Act, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and Enforcement of the Act
Part I.A.1 detailed some of the social and economic forces behind
residential segregation. In Part I.B.1 the U.S. Congress confronts the
problem of civil disorder and identifies residential segregation as an
significant precipitating factor.
1. The Fair Housing Act and § 3608(e)(5)72
In the spring of 1967, violent race riots broke out in Newark and
Detroit.73 Amidst increasing political pressure to ameliorate the rising
racial tensions, President Lyndon B. Johnson formed the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (the Commission).74 The President asked
the Commission to investigate “[t]he origins of the recent major civil
disorders in our cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such
disorders.”75 The Commission spent nine months investigating, and
delivered a comprehensive 426-page document—The Kerner Commission
Report (the Report)—which begins with the Commission’s basic
conclusion: “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.”76 The Commission elevated the issue of
70. Schuck, supra note 66, at 304 (connecting Tiebout Sorting to residential segregation
and noting that expenditure differences across localities enables residents with similar taxing
and spending preferences to group themselves in communities that satisfy them).
71. Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and
Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 1, 5 (1975) (“Once we recognize that the demand for
public services is systematically related to income, we see that the Tiebout model implies
powerful tendencies toward segregation by income level.”); Alexandra M. Greene, Note, An
Examination of Tiebout Sorting and Residential Segregation Through a Racialized Lens, 8
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 143–47 (2008) (connecting Tiebout Sorting to the problem of
residential segregation).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006).
73. LAMB, supra note 18, at 41–42 (describing the role that the 1967 riots played in lead
up to the Kerner Commission Report and passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
74. Exec. Order No. 11,365, § 3, 32 Fed. Reg. 11111 (Aug. 1, 1967) (establishing the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders).
75. Id. at 11112.
76. KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 1; see John Charles Boger, Race and the
American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect—An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1289, 1296-97 (1993) (noting the importance of the Commission’s basic conclusion). The
opening statement of the Kerner Report continues:
Reaction to last summer’s disorders has quickened the movement and deepened
the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of
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residential segregation from a mere fact of life in America to one of the
precipitating factors of the racial riots, labeling it as something that could
lead to “the destruction of basic democratic values.”77
The Report outlined three alternative strategies the country could take in
response to the Report’s central finding: (1) the “Present Policies Choice”
would have maintained the status quo of near nonintervention, (2) the
“Enrichment Choice” would have substantially increased social services in
inner-city neighborhoods but not have made a concerted effort to integrate,
and (3) the “Integration” choice would have incentivized a mobilization of
inner-city African Americans and actively desegregated American cities.78
Implicit in the conclusions of the Report was recognition that merely ending
discrimination in the housing markets would not be enough to stem the tide
of racial isolation and tension in American cities.79
Congress, at the urging of President Johnson, took notice of the Report80
and, in the “tense days following the assassination of Martin Luther King,
Jr.,”81 passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which is now known as the
FHA.82 Through the Act, Congress acknowledged the connection between
residential segregation and rising racial tensions. However, the Act’s focus
on prohibiting racial discrimination in the housing markets likely reflected
an unrealistic view of what it would take to solve the residential segregation

American life; they now threaten the future of every American. This deepening
racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can be reversed. Choice is
still possible. Our principal task is to define that choice and to press for a national
resolution. To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization
of the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic
values.
KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 1; see also Susan Olzak, Suzanne Shanahan &
Elizabeth H. McEneaney, Poverty, Segregation, and Race Riots: 1960 to 1993, 61 AM. SOC.
REV. 590, 607–10 (1996) (reporting results from a sociological study that supports the
Kerner Report’s finding that racial isolation is correlated with social unrest).
77. KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
78. Id. at 395–96; see Boger, supra note 76, at 1305 (stating that the Kerner Commission
“warned America that it must choose among three mutually exclusive policy alternatives”).
79. Both the “Enrichment Choice” and the “Integration Choice” emphasize positive
action on the part of the government instead of mere prohibitions on racial discrimination in
the housing markets. See Boger, supra note 76, at 1302–03.
80. See 114 Cong. Rec. 9557 (1968) (statement of Rep. Anderson) (“In voting for this
bill I seek . . . to reward and encourage the millions of decent, hardworking, loyal, black
Americans who do not riot and burn. I seek to give them the hope that the dream of owning
a home in the suburbs or a decent apartment in the city will not be denied the man who was
born black.”); LAMB, supra note 18, at 42 (arguing that the Kerner Report “probably”
influenced Congress’s views on segregation leading up to the Fair Housing Act of 1968
vote).
81. Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The
Problem of Fair Housing, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 874, 880 (1988) (noting the connection
between the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the timing of Congress passing the
FHA); see also Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 149 (1969) (stating that “the assassination of Martin
Luther King sped action in the House of Representatives”).
82. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII (Fair Housing), 82 Stat. 73
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)).
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problem.83 The Act provided that racial discrimination in the housing
markets would be eradicated in three successive phases.84 The first phase
banned discrimination in either the sale or rental of housing on the basis of
race, color, religion or national origin in housing owned, operated or
guaranteed by the federal government.85 The next two phases applied this
prohibition first to private multi-family dwellings and then to single-family
dwellings.86 The three-phased attack on discrimination was the principal
mechanism by which Congress hoped to influence the country to move
toward an imprecise vision of “fair housing.”87
The chief architects of the FHA, Senators Edward Brooke and Walter
Mondale, viewed “fair housing” broadly.88 Their perception of the problem
and potential solutions aligned more closely with the Report, but it was
their appreciation for the politics of desegregation that can be credited as
their enduring legacy. The architects recognized that an all-out attack on
segregation through legislative adoption of the “Integration Choice” would
be politically impractical in 1968.89 They opted for a second-best solution:
a requirement that all federal funds allocated to affordable housing
programs be used “affirmatively to further” fair housing.90 In doing so, the
FHA defers to HUD and the federal courts to define and enforce the AFFH

83. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (“It is
true that the Act was designed primarily to prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental,
financing, or brokerage of private housing and to provide federal enforcement procedures for
remedying such discrimination . . . .”); see also Dubofsky, supra note 81, at 158–61 (noting
that the bulk of Senate floor debate focused on the discrimination provisions).
84. See Dubofsky, supra note 81, at 156.
85. Id. at 160–61.
86. Id. at 161.
87. John W. Mashek, President Signs Civil Rights Bill; Pleads for Calm, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1968, at 1 (noting that the Act’s “major provision is intended to end racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of [eighty percent] of the nation’s homes and
apartments”).
88. 114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (1968) (statement of Senator Brooke).
Today’s Federal housing official commonly inveighs against the evils of ghetto
life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their triumph—even as he OK’s public
housing sites in the heart of the [African American] slums, releases planning and
urban renewal funds to cities dead-set against integration, and approves the
financing of suburban subdivisions from which [African-Americans] will be
barred. These and similar acts are committed daily by officials who say they are
unalterably opposed to segregation, and have the memos to prove it . . . . But
when you ask one of these [HUD administrators] why, despite the 1962 fair
housing order most public housing is still segregated, he invariably blames it on
regional custom, local traditions, personal prejudices of municipal housing
officials.
Id. Westchester officials used a similar tactic when confronted with their failure to locate
housing projects outside primarily African-American neighborhoods: they pointed to the
municipalities and claimed they had no authority over them to direct placement of the
projects. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing the reaction of
Westchester officials); infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the relationship between HUD grantees
and individual municipalities).
89. See Dubofsky, supra note 81, at 159 (noting the negotiating required to pass the
FHA with virtually no explicit provisions for proactive desegregation).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006).
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duty consistent with the Act.91 The next section will examine how the
courts have interpreted this language.
2. Federal Courts and the AFFH Duties of § 3608(e)(5)
Federal courts have uniformly held that the AFFH requirement of
§ 3608(e)(5) is functional and not simply a “restate[ment of] HUD’s
existing legal obligation.”92 In NAACP v. Secretary of Housing & Urban
Development,93 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reasoned that
statements of the FHA’s framers do not comport with the theory that the
AFFH duty is simply a reiteration of the government’s Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection obligation.94 Interpreting the intent of Senator Brooke, the
court noted that “a purpose of [the FHA] is to remedy the ‘weak intentions’
that have led to the federal government’s ‘sanctioning discrimination in
housing throughout this Nation.’”95 This court contrasted this idea with
Senator Brooke’s point that the FHA “does not promise to end the
ghetto . . . but it will make it possible for those who have the resources to
escape.”96 The court found that the purpose of the FHA “reflects the desire
to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing
increases.”97
The First Circuit went on to note that the plain meaning of “affirmatively
to further” seemed to impose more on HUD than simply a prohibition on
91. See infra Part I.B.2.
92. See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir.
1987) (rejecting HUD’s argument “that § 3608(e)(5) imposes upon HUD only an obligation
not to discriminate”); Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398,
417 (D. Md. 2005) (stating that the duty holds HUD to a “high standard [and] in this case to
have a commitment to desegregation”); Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 776 F. Supp. 637, 642
(D. R.I. 1991) (noting that “while HUD has discretion in carrying out its duty, the duty itself
is not discretionary” and must be exercised in favor of fair housing).
93. 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; NAACP, 817 F.2d at 154. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that in light of the Equal Protection duty
imposed upon the states, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Id. at 500. Thus, the Court extended Equal
Protection duties to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. Prior to the enactment of the FHA plaintiffs commonly used Equal
Protection to prevent HUD and local housing authorities from placing housing projects in
heavily nonwhite concentrated areas. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F.
Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (holding that the plaintiffs “have the right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to have sites selected for public housing projects without regard to
the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the projects
themselves.”). It should be noted that the obligation under Equal Protection only goes so far
as to say that HUD and local authorities cannot, as the defendants did in Gautreaux,
intentionally build projects in areas of high racial concentrations. See id. at 583–84 (“A
showing of affirmative discriminatory state action is required.”); see also id. (dismissing a
claim that the Chicago Housing Authority violated its duty to select sites for public housing
in a manner which would alleviate existing patterns of residential segregation).
95. NAACP, 817 F.2d at 154 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Brooke)).
96. Id. at 154 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (statement of Sen. Brooke)).
97. Id. at 155.
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discrimination.98 The court interpreted the words within the context in
which they were written and the reality that discrimination had infiltrated
all aspects of American life.99 If the AFFH language was interpreted as
merely imposing a prohibition of intentional discrimination on HUD, the
court reasoned, then fair housing would not be “affirmatively furthered”
with respect to private and institutional actors that significantly contribute
to the working of the housing market.100
U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports the First Circuit’s interpretation
of the underlying purpose of the FHA. The plaintiffs in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance,101 two current tenants of the apartment
complex in question, alleged that the actions of the landlord had caused
them to: (1) lose the social benefits of living in an integrated community,
(2) miss out on business opportunities which would arise in an integrated
environment, and (3) suffer embarrassment and economic damages from
being stigmatized as living in a “white ghetto.”102 In concluding that the
current tenant-plaintiffs had standing under the FHA, the Court stated, “The
person on the landlord’s blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory
housing practices; [so] is . . . ‘the whole community.’”103 The Court
reasoned that recognition of standing to a broad range of private actors
under the act was consistent with Senator Mondale’s vision to move toward
“truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”104
a. Application of § 3608(e)(5) to HUD
HUD has been found liable under § 3608(e)(5) in two distinct scenarios:
(1) where HUD itself has failed in its AFFH duty105 and (2) where HUD
knows of a downstream failure by a grantee to comply with the FHA.106
In the 1970 decision Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development,107 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the
first circuit court to hold HUD liable under theory (1).108 The Shannon
court explicitly stated that § 3608(e)(5) imparts a duty on HUD to consider
the impact that a given project might have on an area’s concentration of

98. Id. at 154.
99. See id. at 155.
100. Id. at 154 (“[I]t is difficult to see how HUD’s own nondiscrimination by itself could
significantly ‘further’ the ending of such discrimination.” (emphasis added)).
101. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
102. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 211 (1972) (quoting Sen.
Mondale).
103. Id. at 211 (quoting Sen. Jarvis).
104. See id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See Glendale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Greensboro Hous. Auth., 901 F. Supp. 996,
1009 (M.D. N.C. 1995) (holding that HUD’s failure to follow site selection regulations is a
violation of AFFH duty resulting in HUD’s liability).
106. Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1536–37 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting
that HUD can be held liable where HUD knows of a downstream failure but continues to
fund the noncompliant grantee).
107. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
108. Id. at 822.
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racial minorities.109 More recently, in Thompson v. U.S. Department of
Housing & Urban Development,110 the U.S. District Court for the District
of Maryland applied this principle to the entire city of Baltimore, which was
heavily segregated and found that HUD had insufficiently considered
“public housing opportunities beyond the City limits” of Baltimore.111 The
court focused the inquiry on whether the efforts were effective in
Locating housing projects within
“disestablishing segregation.”112
Baltimore, an area that was heavily concentrated with a nonwhite
population, did not fulfill HUD’s duty to “affirmatively further” fair
housing.113
The second theory by which HUD can be held liable under § 3608(e)(5)
is a situation in which HUD is “aware” of a grantee’s noncompliance with
the Act and fails to terminate its funding.114 In Anderson v. City of
Alpharetta,115 the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that HUD should be held
liable for failing to prevent the municipal housing authority from acting in
contravention of the AFFH requirement prior to HUD approval of the
housing projects.116 The court held that to hold HUD responsible in this
failure to monitor-type claim HUD must be: (1) aware of the violation and
(2) currently providing federal funds to the grantee.117

109. Id. at 816. In response to Shannon, HUD developed site selection regulations that
would ensure compliance with both the substantive and procedural requirements of the
Shannon decision. See discussion infra Part I.C.1–2 (detailing the components of the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) fund-granting mechanism such as the
Consolidated Plan, various certifications of the grantee, and Analysis of Impediments).
110. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 450 (D. Md. 2005).
111. Id. at 450 (D. Md. 2005); id. at 408 (“The Court finds . . . that Plaintiffs have proven
a statutory claim . . . with respect to HUD, and its failure adequately to consider a regional
approach to desegregation of public housing . . . .”).
112. Id. at 448. The court concluded that HUD defines the area in which it is appropriate
to analyze potential remedial efforts as the “housing market area.” Id. The “housing market
area” in turn is defined by a Metropolitan Statistical Area that includes the area within
Baltimore City limits as well as surrounding municipalities. Id. at 503. The racial
composition of the Baltimore City area was found to be sixty-four percent African American
compared to the twenty-eight percent within the Metropolitan Statistical Area. Id. With
knowledge of these facts, HUD located eighty-nine percent of the Metropolitan Statistical
Area’s public housing within the City of Baltimore. Id. “As a result, Baltimore City has
become a ‘regional magnet’ for families unable to afford housing . . . .” Id. at 504.
113. Id. at 508; see Shannon, 436 F.2d at 811–14 (holding HUD liable for approving
federal assistance for a public housing project without considering its effect: to force it into
compliance with the Act by cutting off existing federal financial assistance).
114. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1984); Client’s
Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406 (8th Cir. 1983); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th
Cir. 1971).
115. 737 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1984).
116. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d at 1534–35.
117. Id. at 1537 (explaining that policy considerations support the rule of holding HUD
liable for knowingly funding noncompliant grantees: “the termination of federal funds is
virtually the only weapon available to HUD in its efforts to enforce” the FHA).
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b. Application of § 3608(e)(5) to Grantees
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,118 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was confronted with a situation in which the
New York City Housing Authority (the Authority) decided that white
residents were needed in a federally funded housing project to prevent the
racial composition from reaching a “tipping point” that would have caused
the project’s racial composition to spiral to a completely segregated and all
non-white state.119
The court found constitutional and statutory sources for the Authority’s
obligation to “act affirmatively to achieve integration” and then approved
the Authority’s strategy.120 The Equal Protection Clause prohibits housing
authorities from implementing a tenant assignment policy that assigns a
tenant of a given race to an area for the very reason that the area is highly
concentrated with the tenant’s race.121 The court turned to § 3608(e)(5) of
the Act for the Authority’s statutory obligation: “[a]ction must be taken to
fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential housing
patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation.”122 Section 3608(e)(5)
clearly states that the AFFH duty applies to the Secretary of HUD but the
Otero court held that this duty also applies to “other agencies administering
federally-assisted housing programs.”123 Even after HUD transfers federal
funds to the Authority, the statutory obligation to “affirmatively further”
fair housing remains.124
3. Direct Challenge of AFFH Violations is Not Available
The enforcement provisions of the FHA provide three methods of
enforcement: (1) suits by the Attorney General,125 (2) administrative
complaints to HUD,126 and (3) court actions brought by private plaintiffs.127
Provisions of the Act significantly limit the scope of each of the three
118. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
119. Id. at 1122–30.
120. Id. at 1133.
121. Id. (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969))
(implying that the exclusion of the strategy overruled in Gautreaux indirectly channels a
housing authority’s efforts toward integration by channeling racial minorities to low
concentration areas).
122. Id. at 1134.
123. Id.; see also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 73 (D. Mass.
2002) (extending the AFFH duty to a local housing authority).
When viewed in the larger context of [the FHA], the legislative history, and the
case law, there is no way—at least, none that makes sense—to construe the
boundary of the duty to affirmatively further fair housing as ending with the
Secretary . . . [t]hese regulations unambiguously impose mandatory requirements
on the [public housing authorities] not only to certify their compliance . . . but
actually to comply.
Id. at 73, 75.
124. See Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (2006).
126. See id. § 3612.
127. See id. § 3613.
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methods of enforcement.128 Suits by the Attorney General are only allowed
when the defendant engages in a “pattern or practice” of discrimination, or
when the discrimination raises “an issue of general public importance.”129
The FHA enforcement scheme unsurprisingly aligns with the central
focus of the Act: the prohibition of discrimination in housing markets.130
Notably, there is not a statutory provision that provides direct enforcement
of § 3608(e)(5).131 The enforcement mechanism that does exist is
derivative.132 In NAACP,133 for example, the First Circuit held that the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)134 allows federal courts to review
claims that the Secretary of HUD is not affirmatively furthering the
purposes of the FHA.135 The APA creates a presumption that final agency
action and determinations of whether the agency action conforms with
statutory obligations are judicially reviewable.136 Therefore, any final
agency action on the part of HUD, including approving the location of a
housing project or providing funds to a grantee, is reviewable under the
APA and § 3608(e)(5)’s AFFH obligations.137

128. Eugene R. Gaetke & Robert G. Schwemm, Government Lawyers and Their Private
“Clients” Under the Fair Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 331–33 (1997).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 3613. This restriction positions the Attorney General as a “minimal”
participant in the FHA enforcement scheme. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 211 (1972). This minimal level of participation is evidenced by the fact that “in the
seven years that preceded enactment of the [FHA], the Justice Department brought an
average of only ten fair housing cases per year.” Gaetke & Schwemm, supra note 128, at
332.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (defining “discriminatory housing practice” as “an act that is
unlawful” under § 3604 (discrimination in the sale or rental of housing), § 3605
(discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions), § 3606 (discrimination in the
provision of brokerage services), or § 3617 (interference, coercion, or intimidation); but not
including failure to comply with § 3608(e)(5) as a “discriminatory housing practice”); Nat’l
Comm’n of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 4 (Sept. 22, 2008) (testimony
of Michael Allen) (noting that the narrow definition of “discriminatory housing practice” in
42 U.S.C. § 3602 does not include “a failure to comply with the obligations of § 3608(e)(5)”
and therefore prevents the AFFH obligation from being enforceable by private parties such
as fair housing and community groups).
131. Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and 3604(c): A New Look
at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 195 n.24
(2001) (“Claims based on § 3608 . . . are not covered by the FHA’s enforcement provisions
and therefore must be brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
132. See supra Introduction (describing the Anti-Discrimination Center action).
133. 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987).
134. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706.
135. NAACP, 817 F.2d at 151 (rejecting the district court’s finding that it could not
legally review the claim the court wrote, “We believe . . . that the court has the power to
review appellant’s claim that the Secretary has not ‘administer[ed]’ certain HUD programs
‘in a manner affirmatively to further’ the Act’s basic policy”).
136. Id. at 152 (“This ‘presumption’ of judicial reviewability, now codified in the
[Administrative Procedure Act] applies not only to ‘[a]gency action made reviewable by
statute,’ but also to any other ‘final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court . . . .’”).
137. See id. at 157.
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The standard of review under the APA is extraordinarily deferential to
HUD.138 For example, HUD’s decision to approve a subsidized housing
project will be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”139 The duty is
“essentially procedural.”140 So long as HUD adheres to the “procedural”
requirements of the Act and, in the case of housing project site selection, as
long as HUD at least considers the relevant racial and environmental
factors, the duty is met.141 Furthermore, unlike the enforcement options
available to individuals alleging discrimination under the FHA, aggrieved
persons alleging § 3608(e)(5) violations cannot bring actions against HUD
grantees.142 The FHA’s reliance on HUD to enforce the grantee’s AFFH
duties implicates HUD’s granting mechanism. In the next section this Note
focuses on the fund granting mechanism used in the Community

138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court applied the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971). Commenting on how narrow the inquiry is, the Court stated:
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment . . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Id. at 416.
139. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Darst-Webbe Tenant
Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 710, 712–13 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
“that HUD cannot be forced to require the City to comply with the certifications it made,”
but rejecting the district court’s view that (1) the court has “little authority to direct an
agency on exactly what to do, exactly how to do it, and exactly how to fund it,” and (2)
HUD’s subjective belief that it “has taken all necessary steps to further fair housing” is
enough to fulfill its AFFH duty); Alschuler v. HUD, 686 F.2d 472, 485 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that HUD’s analysis of the impact of a proposed project on the racial composition
of the community was not “arbitrary and capricious” because HUD did not rely on a
“materially distorted picture of the racial and economic balance of the relevant area”); Bus.
Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 875 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that “[h]ousing
decisions . . . require a subtle assessment of past and future housing trends” and the decision
of whether or not to characterize the population of a proposed project as part of one
neighborhood or the other in analyzing the impact on racial composition of the area is
“clearly a judgment within the purview of informed administrative discretion”); S.E. Chi.
Comm’n v. HUD, 488 F.2d 1119, 1131 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that an extensive
memorandum supporting HUD’s strategy to integrate a community will not be found to be
“arbitrary and capricious” decision made solely on the grounds that the strategy “bore some
risk of failure”).
140. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978) (holding that once an agency meets procedural requirements, the court cannot
interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive). Cf. Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t. of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 421 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that while HUD
analyzed the racial impact of housing projects the Department too narrowly circumscribed
the potential solutions to the high nonwhite concentrations in Baltimore City).
141. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION DATABASE
§ 21:3 (2009).
142. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(1) (stating that the Administrative
Procedures Act only applies to federal agencies).
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Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, which is similar to the
mechanisms used in each of HUD’s fund granting programs.143
C. Dispersal of HUD Funds
The dispersal of HUD funds is central to Anti-Discrimination-type
actions. The FCA action is based on the complicated fund-granting
mechanism and the requirement the grantees conduct an Analysis of
Impediments that complies with HUD guidelines. The next section address
this fund-granting mechanism.
1. Community Development Block Grants
The CDBG program, representing about ten percent and $3.9 billion of
HUD’s annual budget,144 is designed as a flexible fund-granting mechanism
that enables state and local governments to channel funds toward a number
of eligible community development needs.145 This flexibility is apparent
when the range of projects and activities funded by CDBGs are examined.
The most basic way CDBGs are used is to finance public facilities and
improvements.146 The funds also allow community-based organizations to
deliver public services such as child day-care, adult literacy programs and
assistance for the homeless.147 A third category of CDBG fund use is
economic development aimed at creating jobs for low or medium income
persons.148 While eligible uses are varied, HUD has developed specific
procedures for granting funds and monitoring their implementation. Many
of these procedures are designed to ensure that HUD and the grantees are in
compliance with the FHA and CDBG regulations.

143. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED
PLAN AND PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION REPORT SUBMISSIONS FOR LOCAL JURISDICTIONS
1 (2009), http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/conplan/toolsandguidance/guidance/pdf/
local_guidelines_09-11.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR
PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN] (listing the CDBG, HOME Investment Partnerships
(HOME), Emergency Shelter Grant (ESG), and Housing Opportunities for Persons with
AIDS (HOPWA) as four formula programs that use the Consolidated Plan to allocate funds).
144. HUD’S FY 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 3 (showing the 2009 CDBG
program expenditure to be $3.9 billion).
145. See Top to Bottom Review of the Three-Decades-Old Community Development Block
Grant Program: Is the CDBG Program Still Targeting the Needs of Our Communities?:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Federalism and the Census, 109th Cong. 7–8 (2005)
(statement of Roy A. Bernardi, Deputy Secretary, HUD) (“The CDBG program is the
Federal Government’s largest single grant program to assist local jurisdictions in
undertaking a variety of community development activities targeted to improving the lives of
low and moderate-income Americans.”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CDBG
FORMULA TARGETING TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT NEED iii (2005) [hereinafter CDBG
FORMULA] (describing the primary objectives of the CDBG program); Community
Development
Block
Grant
Program,
HUD,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
communitydevelopment/programs/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (describing the CDBG
program as a “flexible” funding source).
146. See GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN, supra note 143, at 6.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 5.
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State and local governments apply for CBGD funding by completing a
Consolidated Plan.149 The Consolidated Plan is an opportunity for the local
jurisdiction to establish a “unified vision for community development
actions” and provide evidence to HUD of the community’s compliance with
various regulations, including the FHA’s AFFH requirement.150 The
Consolidated Plan requires communities to conduct an Analysis of
Impediments (AI)—a comprehensive study of various impediments to fair
housing—and to certify that the jurisdiction’s plans for the CDBG funds are
compliant with the grantee’s AFFH duty.151 The Consolidated Plan
requirement and accompanying certification process is the key element of
HUD’s AFFH enforcement scheme. If the community fails to submit the
Plan or certify AFFH compliance, the jurisdiction will not receive federal
funds.152
HUD prioritizes all state and local government CDBG requests using the
CDBG Formula.153 The formula incorporates the elements of community
development listed in the CDBG statute, 42 U.S.C. § 5301, such as poverty,
neighborhood blight, deteriorated housing, physical and economic distress,
and isolation of income groups.154 The formula aims to identify areas
where the community development needs are greatest.155

149. 24 C.F.R. § 91.2(a)(1) (2009) (listing the Consolidated Plan regulatory
requirements); GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN, supra note 143, at 1
(describing the Consolidated Plan as a “means to meet the submission requirements” for the
CDBG program).
150. GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN, supra note 143, at 1.
151. Id. at 25–26.
152. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at i (describing the consolidated plan
and the certification that communities will affirmatively further fair housing as “a condition
of receiving Federal funds”).
153. CDBG FORMULA, supra note 145, at 1–3 (providing an introduction to HUD’s use of
the CDBG formula).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006) (listing the community development objectives of the
CDBG program).
155. CDBG FORMULA, supra note 145, at iii (explaining that Congress designed the
formula to “provide larger grants to communities with relatively high community
development need and smaller grants to communities with relatively low community
development need”). The CDBG funds are divided into two pools: 70% is allocated to
entitlement communities (defined as eligible metropolitan cities and counties) and 30% is
allocated to states to serve non-entitled communities. Id. at vii. Two formulas are used to
rate each recipient category. Formula A takes into account a given community’s
metropolitan share of population (weighted at 25%); poverty (weighted at 50%); and
overcrowding (weighted at 25%). Id. at vii, viii. Formula B takes into account a given
community’s growth lag or the difference between the community’s actual growth and the
growth it would have had if it grew as an average community did since 1960 (weighted at
20%); the community’s share of metropolitan area poverty (weighted at 30%); and the
community’s share of pre-1940 housing (weighted at 50%). Id. at vii–viii. The community’s
CDBG “need” is calculated by taking the higher (i.e. the score that would allocate more
funds to the community) of the two scores and allocating based on that score. Id. The
effectiveness of the CDBG formula in quantifying “need” in a way that does justice to the
legislative intent of § 5301 has been questioned. Id. at 96 (concluding that “serious
consideration should be given to changing the formula to improve its targeting [of
community] need”).

2010]

PROMOTING RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION

1391

2. Analysis of Impediments
The AI component of the Consolidated Plan and AFFH certification
requires that grantees certify that they “will conduct an analysis to identify
impediments to fair housing choice within the area, take appropriate actions
to overcome the effects of any impediments . . . and maintain records
reflecting the analysis.”156 This requirement aligns the CDBG fundgranting mechanism with the federal court’s interpretation of HUD’s AFFH
duty.157 HUD has a duty to analyze the impact a housing project might
have on the racial concentration of minorities in the community.158 The
AFFH language requires HUD to use its grant programs to move towards
an ideal of “genuinely open housing.”159 The AI requirement calls on the
grantees, with intimate knowledge of their community, to detail all the
impediments that have so far prevented the community from achieving
“genuinely open housing.”160
HUD defines AI as a “review of impediments to fair housing choice in
the public and private sector.”161 “Impediments” are further defined as
“any actions, omissions, or decisions taken because of race, color, religion,
sex, disability, familial status, or national origin that restrict housing
choices or the availability of housing choices.”162 HUD’s regulations
mandate that the AI be completed, kept on record and that the grantee
certify the AI has been completed, but rarely audits the grantee’s AI to
ensure that it sufficiently analyzed impediments.163 Thus, grantees expend
varying degrees of effort in fulfilling the AI requirement.
3. HUD Enforcement of § 3608(e)(5)
Numerous enforcement provisions of the FHA allow aggrieved parties to
bring direct suits against those who intentionally discriminate in the
housing markets.164 The FHA’s AFFH duties lack a similar enforcement
provision: parties must rely on derivative actions.165 HUD’s AFFH duties
can be enforced through the APA, but the extremely deferential “arbitrary
and capricious” standard of review limits many potential causes of action
156. 24 C.F.R. § 91.425 (a)(1)(i) (2010); see also id. § 570.601(a)(2).
157. CDBG FORMULA, supra note 145, at 5.
158. See Alschuler v. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 482 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that HUD and HUD grantees have a duty to consider racial impediments to fair
housing).
159. 114 CONG. REC. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (stating that the FHA
reflects a “desire to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases.”)
160. Id.
161. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at 4-4.
162. Id.
163. See CITY OF OAKLAND, CMTY. & ECON. DEV. AGENCY, FAIR HOUSING PLANNING:
ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING 49–63 (2005) (detailing the racially segregated
housing patterns in the City of Oakland).
164. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (providing for private
enforcement of prohibitions against “discriminatory housing practices”).
165. See supra Part I.B.
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against HUD.166 Municipal or state violation of AFFH duties can
theoretically be challenged through a § 1983 action, but some courts are
becoming reluctant to entertain claims based on § 3608(e)(5) against state
or local government entities.167 In light of these restrictions, enforcement
of AFFH violations is left in the hands of HUD.168
Advocacy groups have noted that HUD has not “developed the
enforcement tools or the political will to take on the powerful constituent
groups, like mayors, governors and county executives who are the primary
recipients of CDBG” funds.169 The argument is that HUD, and its office of
Community Planning and Development which oversees the CDBG
program, views these elected officials as “[their] chief constituents.”170
There is not any data available that would definitively prove that HUD is
ineffective in enforcing the AFFH obligations of its grantees.171 However,
there is sufficient evidence that levels of segregation have only dissipated
moderately since the enactment of the FHA in 1968.172 There is also
anecdotal evidence of HUD’s inability to effectively enforce the AFFH
obligation. For example, consider HUD’s inaction with respect to
Westchester during a seven-year false claims period. At a recent housing
policy conference a “long-time HUD employee said he could think of only
three instances over 20 years in which HUD” terminated CDBG funding for
failure to comply with the AFFH duty.173
D.

The False Claims Act and Qui Tam Actions

The FHA enforcement scheme was developed to complement the main
thrust of the FHA: prohibition of discrimination. The AFFH requirement is
the only desegregation provision in the Act and can only be enforced
derivatively. HUD’s AFFH duties can be enforced through the APA, but
the extremely deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review
limits many potential causes of action against HUD. These deficiencies in
the FHA enforcement scheme motivated the Center to bring a qui tam
action under the FCA. Part I.D.1 introduces the FCA and the legislative
purpose behind the qui tam provision. Part I.D.2 connects the qui tam
provisions to AFFH enforcement and explores a circuit split over whether
Analysis of Impediments reports can be used as the basis for qui tam
actions.

166. See supra Part I.B.
167. NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR
HOUSING 61 (2008) (making the case for a direct cause of action to enforce AFFH duties).
168. See supra note 106 (noting that HUD can be held liable if it knowingly funds a
noncompliant grantee).
169. Allen, supra note 14, at 2.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Id.
172. See infra note 244 (noting the level of segregation present in Westchester).
173. Nat’l Comm’n of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 4 (Sept. 22,
2008) (testimony of Michael Allen).
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1. Historical Background of the False Claims Act
The first iteration of the FCA was signed into law by President Abraham
Lincoln in 1863.174 Congress hoped to reduce fraud on the part of military
suppliers during the Civil War by creating a statutory right of recovery for
fraudulent claims against the government.175 The innovative mechanism
used by Congress was a qui tam provision that allowed any individual176
(known as the relator) to file a claim on behalf of the government and reap
fifty percent of a recovery amount.177 Recognizing the difficulty in
maintaining perfect oversight in the administration of large federal
government operations, the FCA took advantage of: (1) the knowledge of
private individuals to detect fraud178 and (2) the resources of the private
citizen to bring the fraud in front of the court and follow it through until
judgment.179 “Lincoln’s law,” as the FCA was known to many, would
prove to be only a temporary solution: it was heavy on the incentives, but
light on a nuanced approach to balancing the incentives with limitations to
counter parasitic action on the part of qui tam relators.180 Two phases of
amendments have honed “Lincoln’s law” into the modern FCA, which will
be briefly discussed below.181
After years of relatively low government spending, the FCA emerged
during the New Deal as a tool to prevent fraud in large-scale public works
projects.182 Soon after its reemergence, the FCA failed to serve its purpose
when the Supreme Court, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,183 upheld
a parasitic claim based solely on an indictment previously filed by the
government.184 This type of action was antithetical to the purposes of the
174. Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696–699 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006)).
175. United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital Mkts., Inc., 377 F.3d 145, 151
(2d Cir. 2004) (“Congress enacted the [FCA] in 1863 with the principal goal of stopping the
massive frauds perpetrated by large private contractors during the Civil War.’” (quoting Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000))).
176. The constitutionality of qui tam standing has been a topic of frequent scholarly
discussion. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 544 (2000) (noting the constitutional debate).
177. Lissack, 377 F.3d at 151.
178. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943) (“[O]ne of the
chief purposes of the Act . . . was to stimulate action . . . and large rewards were offered to
stimulate actions by private parties.”).
179. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War
Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1998).
180. Gary W. Thompson, A Critical Analysis of Restrictive Interpretation Under the
False Claims Act’s Public Disclosure Bar: Reopening the Qui Tam Door, 27 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 669, 672–73 (1998).
181. See Meador & Warren, supra note 179, at 459–60 (noting that Congress amended
the FCA once in 1943 and a second time in 1986).
182. See id. at 459.
183. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
184. See id. at 542 (“We think the conduct of these respondents comes well within the
prohibition of the statute, which includes ‘every person who . . . causes to be presented, for
payment . . . any claim upon or against the Government of the United States . . . knowing
such claim to be . . . fraudulent” (quoting Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696–99 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006))).
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Act because the private party did not expose information concerning a
fraudulent claim, instead the party simply beat the government to the
courthouse when the Department of Justice was already en route.185 This
type of claim is parasitic in the sense that the party bringing the claim
attempts to siphon off a percentage of the government’s claim without
benefiting the government.186 Congress reacted quickly to the apparent
flaw in the functioning of President Lincoln’s FCA and in 1943 amended
the FCA to include a provision only allowing qui tam actions “based upon
information, evidence and sources not in the possession . . . of the United
States.”187
In the years following the adoption of the 1943 FCA amendment, it
became clear that the bar on information “in the possession of the United
States” went too far.188 It prevented private citizens from bringing a very
useful set of actions in which the relator, through a qui tam suit, shows the
government that information already in government hands amounts to fraud
when the government otherwise would not have come to this conclusion.189
The other problem created by the restriction was that it was very difficult
for the private citizen to determine whether or not the information was “in
the possession of the United States” prior to initiation of the suit.190
The pendulum of restrictions on qui tam actions swung back in 1986 and
settled somewhere between the liberal provisions of “Lincoln’s law” and
the restrictive 1943 amendments.191 The 1986 amendments repositioned
Congress’s attempt to block parasitic qui tam actions by shifting focus from
whether the government was “in possession” of the information to whether
the act was based upon information that was publicly disclosed.192
Accordingly, the 1986 amendments added the following language to the
FCA:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, or
from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General

185. See Marcus, 317 U.S. at 537.
186. Thompson, supra note 180, at 697.
187. Id. at 676.
188. See id.
189. Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006)).
190. See James Roy Moncus III, Note, The Marriage of the False Claims Act and the
Freedom of Information Act: Parasitic Potential or Positive Synergy?, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1549, 1556 (2002).
191. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir.
1991) (noting that the intent of the 1986 amendments to the FCA was to “have the qui tam
suit provision operate somewhere between the almost unrestrained permissiveness
represented by the Marcus decision . . . and the restrictiveness of the post-1943 cases, which
precluded suit even by original sources”).
192. See id.
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or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.193

This provision, referred to as the FCA’s public disclosure bar, more
accurately pinpoints the parasitic Marcus-type action that Congress
intended to discourage with the 1943 Amendments to the FCA.194 What
constitutes “public disclosure,” and each of the enumerated forms of public
disclosure such as “administrative report,” has been contested.
The FCA imposes liability on any person who “knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”195
The FCA further defines “knowingly” as when a person “(1) has actual
knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth
or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required.”196 Thus, the FCA requires mere “reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of the information” rather than the more stringent intent
requirement of common law fraud.197
Qui tam actions are derivative in nature—the qui tam relator is suing on
behalf of the government—and the procedural requirements of the FCA
reflect a desire to balance the right of the U.S. Government to sue on the
government’s behalf with the right of the relator to bring information
exposing fraud forward, initiate the action, and claim a portion of the
recovery.198 Under the qui tam provision of the FCA, “[a] person may
193. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
194. See Moncus, supra note 190, at 1556–57 (describing the modern public disclosure
bar).
195. 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(1).
196. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
197. See Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420
(9th Cir. 1982) (“The [FCA’s] scienter requirement is something less than that set out in the
common law, where the words ‘to defraud’ commonly refer to wronging one in his property
rights by dishonest methods or schemes, and usually signify the deprivation of something of
value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
198. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (stating that suits are brought in the name of the government);
Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act,
57 U. CHI. L. REV 543, 571 (1990) (describing the standing of qui tam relators as
“derivative” and questioning the ability of qui tam relators to satisfy Article III standing
requirements). The procedural requirements of a qui tam suit are, in many ways, analogous
to the more common shareholder derivative suit. In shareholder derivative suits, the
shareholder attempts to sue officers and directors of the corporation on behalf of the
corporation itself. See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1993)
(describing shareholder derivative suits as permitting shareholders to sue “derivatively on
their corporation’s behalf”). The challenge for the courts is to balance the shareholder’s
right to sue with the board’s right to manage the corporation—after all, the suit is being
brought on behalf of the corporation. Id. (noting the conflict between permitting shareholders
to champion their corporation’s rights and the right of corporations to resolve internal
conflicts without court intervention). Courts, namely the Delaware Chancery Court, have
developed procedural rules that force the shareholder to either make a demand to the board
of directors to bring the suit themselves or prove that such demand would be futile. See id. at
1343–53 (describing the shareholder demand requirement and the futility exception). The
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bring a civil action for a violation of [the FCA] for the person and for the
United States Government.”199 “The action shall be brought in the name of
the government.”200 The FCA gives the United States the option to “either
intervene and prosecute the action, or allow the original plaintiff—the qui
tam relator—to proceed with the suit.”201 The government has sixty days to
investigate the matter and decide whether or not to intervene.202 Even
when the government opts not to intervene, the government retains an
option to intervene at a later date.203 Whether or not the government
intervenes, “the relator is entitled to a portion of the proceeds if the
prosecution is successful.”204
2. Interaction Between the Public Disclosure Bar and Freedom of
Information Requests for Analysis of Impediments
As Parts I.B and I.C demonstrated, the AFFH duty imposed on HUD
grantees is intimately connected to the grantee’s obligation to analyze
impediments of fair housing. In Anti-Discrimination Center, for example,
Westchester’s failure to analyze racial impediments was used as the basis
for liability.205 As was recognized in Part I.C.2, HUD relies on the
grantee’s certification that a proper analysis was conducted and does not
take possession of or audit the report.206 One difficulty that relators, such
as the Center, run into in bringing an Anti-Discrimination Center-type
action is gaining access to the grantee’s AI report. The relator must gain
access to the report to determine if the analysis was conducted properly,
which often requires a state law freedom of information request such as the
Center’s State of New York Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

demand requirement is similar to the FCA’s procedural requirements that allow the United
States to intervene in qui tam actions if the government so desires. See 31 U.S.C
§ 3730(b)(2).
199. 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(1).
200. Id.
201. United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148,
1153 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the relationship between the relator and the government in
qui tam actions).
202. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
203. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(D)(3). In fact, the government used this second intervention
provision in Anti-Discrimination Center to intervene more than three years after the Center
filed the original compliant. See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y.
v. Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that the United
States had not yet intervened); United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y.,
Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., No. 06-cv-02860-DLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009) (noting that the United States intervened).
204. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). The amount the relator receives varies between fifteen and
twenty-five percent of all damages awarded. See id. § 3730(d). The damages awarded can
be as much as three times the amount of the fraudulent claims. See id. § 3729(a) (stating that
the false claimant is liable “for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than
$10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages the Government sustains”).
205. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *3 (stating that contrary
to Westchester’s duty to conduct an AI, including racial impediments, Westchester failed to
do so).
206. See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text.
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request.207 The nature of this critical piece of evidence, and the means by
which private parties gain access to it, interact with the unique nature of a
qui tam action. The qui tam provisions of the FCA attempt to encourage
private parties to ferret out fraud against the government while
disincentivizing parasitic Marcus-type actions.208 The public disclosure bar
is the mechanism used to balance209 these competing interests and circuit
courts are divided on the issue of how the bar relates to state and municipal
government reports garnered through FOIL-type requests.210
It is important to understand what issues are at play when the public
disclosure bar is applied to state FOIL-type requests, as these same issues
will be confronted by the next district court hearing an Anti-Discrimination
Center-type action. The application of the disclosure bar is a three-pronged
analysis. First, the court must determine whether the action is “based upon”
a “public disclosure” of the wrongdoing.211 Second, the court determines
207. See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text.
208. See United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that the 1986 amendments to the FCA “attempt to strike a balance between
encouraging private citizens to expose fraud and avoiding parasitic actions by opportunists
who attempt to capitalize on public information without seriously contributing to the
disclosure of the fraud”).
209. United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 740 (3d Cir.
1997) (“[T]he 1986 amendments were an attempt to correct what Congress perceived as a
century old imbalance between the under-deterrence of the original Act, which permitted
‘parasitic’ qui tam actions to be brought by individuals with no independent knowledge of
fraud, and the over-deterrence of the 1943 amendments which denied jurisdiction over all
qui tam actions ‘based on evidence or information the government had when the action was
brought.’” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded))).
210. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that circuits are divided on the
issue of whether state government reports, hearings, audits, and investigations are
encompassed by the public disclosure bar of the FHA). Compare Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745
(holding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar does not prohibit actions based on “non-federal
government sources”), and United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 31–33 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that an audit performed by an outside accounting
firm for the federal government qualifies for the public disclosure bar), with United States ex
rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that state agency audit
reports constitute public disclosures and are barred by the public disclosure bar), and Hays v.
Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the Dunleavy approach and
concluding that compliance audits conducted by a state agency authorized to administer a
cooperative federal/state program are “public disclosures”).
211. Although the determination of what amount of information is required to constitute
“public disclosure” was not an important factor in Anti-Discrimination Center, it may be
helpful to briefly explain the analysis. Many cases refer to a passage in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit case of United States ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The D.C. Circuit explained
the leading theory on the issue as follows:
[I]f X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud and X and Y represent its
essential elements. In order to disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the
combination of X and Y must be revealed, from which readers or listeners may
infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that fraud has been committed.
Id. at 654; see, also United States ex rel. Ondis v. City of Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49, 54 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citing to, and following, the Springfield Terminal court’s description of the
information required to constitute “public disclosure”). To infer that fraud has been
committed (Z), one needs knowledge of a misrepresented state of facts (X) and a true state of
facts (Y). Unless the court finds disclosures of both the X and Y variables the fraud cannot
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whether the mode of disclosure is enumerated in the statute.212 In AntiDiscrimination Center-type actions, the question is whether the wrongdoing
was disclosed as an “allegation[] or transaction[]” in an “administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation.”213
Third, if the court determines that the wrongdoing was publicly disclosed as
an enumerated public disclosure, the relator must prove that she is the
“original source” of the information.214
Circuit courts unanimously agree that freedom of information requests
constitute a “public disclosure” within the meaning of the FCA qui tam
provisions.215 In a leading case, United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v.
Housing Authority of Pittsburgh,216 the Third Circuit considered whether an
FCA action based upon letters sent to HUD and later obtained through a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request constituted “public disclosure”
of the wrongdoing.217 The court explained that the central purpose of FOIA
is “to ensure that government activities are opened to the sharp eye of
public scrutiny.”218 Furthermore, the court noted that FOIA declares that
“[e]ach agency shall make available to the public certain specified
categories of information.”219 Citing to the Supreme Court’s view that
disclosure pursuant to a FOIA request constituted public disclosure within
the meaning of the Consumer Products Safety Act,220 the Mistick PBT court
wrote “[w]e see no sound basis for construing ‘public disclosure’ any more
narrowly” in the FCA context.221 Applying Mistick PBT to the Center’s
New York State FOIL request, Judge Denise L. Cote reasoned that the AI
report was “publically disclosed” and qualified for the first prong of the
FCA’s public disclosure bar.222 A similar outcome is likely for the next
Anti-Discrimination Center-type action.
Unlike the first prong, there is considerable disagreement among circuit
courts as to how to apply the second, mode of disclosure, prong to
be considered publicly disclosed. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 741. This analysis can be thought
of as complementing the analysis required to determine whether an alleged disclosure is a
“public disclosure”. See infra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
212. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. See id. (stating that the action is barred if disclosed by an enumerated mode of
disclosure “unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information”).
215. Moncus, supra note 190, at 1581 (noting that the “courts of appeals have almost
universally agreed,” but arguing that the logic of this interpretation is “incongruous with
both the legislative and judicial history” of the FCA).
216. 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
217. Id. at 379 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining the factual background of the case).
218. Id. at 383 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 774
(1989)).
219. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §552(a))
220. Id. (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102
(1980)); see Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2084 (2006).
221. Mistick, 186 F.3d, at 383.
222. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In sum, although the Center’s claim is
based on publicly disclosed information obtained through a FOIL request, the information
was not obtained from a source enumerated in the Section 3730(e)(4)(A) jurisdictional bar.”)
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information garnered via a freedom of information request from a state or
municipal agency.223 The conflict stems from ambiguity in the list used to
enumerate modes of disclosure barred from FCA actions.224 The FCA fails
to distinguish between a state and federal modes of disclosures and leaves
the courts with the responsibility of determining whether an enumerated
mode of disclosure references state or federal “administrative . . . report,
hearing, audit, or investigation.”225 The ambiguity is magnified in AntiDiscrimination Center-type actions in which the state report is arguably
“connected significantly to federal regulations and funds.”226 Some circuit
courts have argued that analysis of the modes of disclosure listed in
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), and specifically the words “congressional” and
“Government Accounting Office,” are federal in nature and should lead to
the inference that “federal” should also modify “administrative reports.”227
Other courts rely more heavily on the purpose behind the public disclosure
bar and view use of a state or municipal administrative report tied to a
federal program to be more parasitic than beneficial.228 The disagreement
among circuit courts is central to the viability of the qui tam action in
enforcing AFFH obligations against HUD grantees because if reports such
as the AI report qualify for the public disclosure bar, the qui tam action will
fail unless the relator can prove that she was an “original source.”229 Part
II.A will explore this conflict in more detail.
The third prong of the public disclosure bar is an exception to the general
rule that public disclosure by way of an enumerated mode of disclosure is
barred.230 If the relator is an “original source” of the public disclosure, the
suit is not barred.231 The Act explicitly states that a relator is an “original
source” if the relator (1) “has direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based,” and (2) “has voluntarily
provided the information to the Government before filing an action.”232
Courts have interpreted “direct knowledge” to require a relator who bases
her lawsuit on an enumerated public disclosure to have witnessed some
aspect of the fraudulent activity—not simply to have collected the
information from others.233 “Independent knowledge” has been interpreted
223. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
225. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
226. United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that state reports “connected significantly to federal regulations and funds”
constitute “administrative reports” and therefore cannot be used in conjunction with FCA
claims).
227. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir.
1997) (applying the concept of noscitur a sociis or “a word is known by the company it
keeps”).
228. See Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 918; United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d
982, 988-91 (8th Cir. 2003);
229. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at § 3730(e)(4)(B).
233. Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 477, 502 (1995).
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as a requirement that the relator have information “that was not derived
from the public disclosure.”234 Finally, the requirement that the relator
voluntarily provide the information to the government has been interpreted
to bar a relator from capitalizing on a situation in which she has been
compelled to reveal the information.235
E. Analyzing Anti-Discrimination Center as “Public Law” Litigation
Part I.D discussed some of the practical concerns surrounding the use of
qui tam to enforce AFFH obligations. Part I.E analogizes the Center’s use
of qui tam to the paradigm of “public law” litigation detailed in Professor
Chayes’ piece The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation236 in hopes of
finding a framework in which the viability of using qui tam to enforce a
HUD grantee’s AFFH obligations can be measured. The discussion briefly
turns back to the particulars of Anti-Discrimination Center as additional
context is provided for presentation of the dispute as a means of enforcing
civil rights and facilitating structural change. Part I.E.1 presents some of
the issues relevant to achieving structural change within HUD. Part I.E.2
then goes on to explain why representation of the parties should not be
taken for granted in “public law” litigation. Part I.E.3 introduces the
problem of positively impacting segregation—actually achieving the goals
of the FHA.
In Anti-Discrimination Center, the Center alleged that Westchester
fraudulently asserted that it had conducted a sufficient AI, fulfilled its
AFFH duty, and was in compliance with FHA. Using this theory, the
Center requested that Westchester repay all the CDBG237 funds received
from HUD between the years 2000 and 2006.238
Initially, Westchester officials wrote the claim off, calling it
“garbage.”239 Westchester attempted to shift blame to the individual
municipalities by asserting that it did not have power to influence the way
234. Id.
235. Id. at 503. Although Judge Cote did not find it necessary to analyze the third prong
of the public disclosure bar, the third prong may provide relators, such as the Center, a way
around a disadvantageous ruling under prong two. The Center arguably had direct and
independent knowledge of where Westchester was channeling HUD funds, but it is unclear
whether the court would require direct knowledge of the faulty AI report. See infra note 244
(describing Westchester’s failure to build subsidized housing across all municipalities).
236. Chayes, supra note 23.
237. The CDBG program was created with the enactment of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5321 (2006). The program is designed to be
flexible by providing communities with resources to “address a wide range of unique
community development needs.” Community Development Block Grant Program,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/. The program provides
funds to both local and state governments. Id.; see supra Part I.C.1 (describing the CDBG
fund-granting mechanism in detail).
238. Complaint at 2, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-cv-2860-DLC) (claiming
Westchester falsely represented compliance with the FHA and “improperly received more
than $45 million in federal funds”).
239. Sam Roberts, Housing Accord in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A1.
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funds were spent by each municipality.240 In papers filed before Judge
Cote, Westchester moved to dismiss the claim. Latching on to one side of a
circuit split, Westchester argued that FCA actions cannot be “based upon” a
municipal report garnered through New York’s FOIL request.241 On July
13, 2007, Judge Cote sided with the Third Circuit, among other circuits, in
approving the use of a municipal report obtained through a FOIL request
and denying Westchester’s motion to dismiss.242 Upon completion of
discovery, Judge Cote granted in part the Center’s motion for summary
judgment, agreeing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the
County submitted false certifications as to its AFFH compliance.243 Judge
Cote found that during the seven-year false claims period, Westchester
failed to consider race as an impediment to fair housing. This failure was
an affront to explicit requirements of HUD and was astounding considering
Westchester’s highly segregated geographic distribution of race. The
failure to analyze race as an impediment resulted in Westchester placing
nearly all of its housing units supported by CDBG funds within high
minority concentration municipalities.244 In response to these findings, on

240. Fernanda Santos, Judge Faults Westchester County on Desegregation Efforts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A24 (“Westchester County officials contend that they have no legal
authority to tell municipalities how to use their land. They have said they found reasonably
priced land where developers could build lower-cost homes and then recommended to
villages and towns how many each of them should have . . . .”); see supra Part I.C.1
(discussing the relationship between HUD grantees and individual municipalities).
241. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, Anti-Discrimination Center, 495 F. Supp. 2d
375 (arguing that the approach used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which would disallow use of state or municipal reports garnered through a freedom of
information requests in FCA actions, should be adopted by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York); see generally New York Freedom of Information Law,
N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85–89 (McKinney 2008). The New York FOIL is patterned after
the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). Ralph J. Marino, The New
York Freedom of Information Law, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 83 (1974). FOIA generally
provides that any person has the right to request access to federal agency records or
information. Id. FOIL picks up where FOIA leaves off and applies this general principal to
State of New York agencies. See id.
242. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (holding that “a local government
entity that certifies to the federal government that it will affirmatively further fair housing as
a condition to its receipt of federal funds must consider the existence and impact of race
discrimination on housing opportunities and choice in its jurisdiction”).
243. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that Westchester fraudulently
certified its actions since “there is simply no evidence that . . . the County[] . . . analyzed
race-based impediments to fair housing”).
244. Plaintiff’s Initial Expert Report of Andrew Beveridge at 16, Anti-Discrimination
Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (describing the allocation of CDBG sponsored housing units in
Westchester). During a ten-year period beginning in 1990, Westchester allocated 5000
housing units to be built but only 1639 of the allocated units were actually built. Id. at 13. In
addition, there were 670 units built beyond allocated number in six communities. Id. The
report observes:
When one looks at the racial composition of these three groups (“over allocation
jurisdictions,” “under allocation jurisdictions,” and “zero unit jurisdictions”), the
differences are stark: the “over allocation jurisdictions” were 24.2 percent nonHispanic black, and 46.8 percent non-Hispanic white; the “under allocation
jurisdiction” were 11.5 percent non-Hispanic black and 65.9 percent non-Hispanic
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August 10, 2009, Westchester tacitly recognized its weak bargaining
position and agreed to spend $62.5 million to compensate HUD and the
Center for the fraudulent assertions.245
The settlement reached between the Center, the United States, and
Westchester involved more than a simple transfer of the CDBG funds
acquired through false claims.246 Westchester was facing upwards of a
$180 million penalty when the treble damages provision of the FCA is
taken into account; which gave the Center and the United States significant
bargaining power.247 Westchester is “repaying” the government by
building $50 million of affordable housing and locating the housing in those
municipalities with the lowest concentrations of African Americans and
Latinos.248 The settlement also includes a requirement that Westchester
conduct a new AI to determine what impediments are impacting fair
housing choice.249 The settlement specifically states that barriers such as
“race” and “municipal resistance” must be examined.250 The court has
appointed an independent monitor to ensure Westchester’s compliance with
the settlement and has retained jurisdiction over the case.251
The purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Center action and the settlement
reached between the government, the Center and Westchester can be
divided into three related components: (1) affecting structural problems
within HUD and Westchester, (2) providing sufficient representation of
white; and the “zero unit jurisdictions” were 2.5 percent non-Hispanic black, and
84.3 percent non-Hispanic white.
Id. at 14.
245. Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 37, Anti-Discrimination Ctr.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (approving the settlement reached between the Center, the government,
and the County).
246. See id. at 6 (“The County shall [construct at least 750 affordable housing units]
solely through County funds, and not from any Federal, State, or other funding sources.”).
247. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C § 3729(a) (2006) (describing the liability for
submitting false claims as “a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than
$10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains”).
248. Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 6–7, Anti-Discrimination
Center, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (mandating that no less than 630 of the housing units must be
located in municipalities with fewer than three percent African American and Latino
populations).
249. Id. at 25 (“The County shall complete, within one hundred twenty calender days . . .
an [AI] with the guidance in HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide . . . .”).
250. See id. at 24–25 (mandating that Westchester review racial and ethnic barriers to fair
housing).
251. Id. at 11 (“The Government, in its sole discretion but with input from the County,
shall select a monitor to be appointed by the Court . . . .”). It should be noted that the Center
is already displeased with the performance of the monitor. See Westchester Legislators Still
Looking to Undercut Settlement Order, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR. (Nov. 30, 2009),
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/news/westchester-legislators-still-looking-undercut-settlementorder (noting displeasure over an apparent meeting between the Monitor and officials from
Westchester County municipalities). The Center quotes Westchester County Legislator
Peter Harkham as stating “[i]t was an extremely positive exchange with Mr. Johnson where
we had a frank discussion on implementation issues—especially the need for local workforce
housing to get buy in from municipalities.” Id. The Center disagrees with the idea of getting
“buy in” from the municipalities when an order was issued. Id. “A federal court order is not
supposed to be some starting point in a continuing negotiation . . . .” Id.
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those negatively impacted by segregation, and (3) positively impacting the
problem of segregation. It is unclear whether Anti-Discirmination Centertype actions achieve these purposes. To assist in answering this question,
this Note turns to the concept of “public law” litigation.
Professor Chayes introduces the concept of “public law” litigation
juxtaposing it against the traditional conception of adjudication.252
Traditional litigation, or the “private law model,” “reflected the late
nineteenth century vision of society, which assumed that the major social
and economic arrangements would result from the activities of autonomous
individuals.”253 The role of the courts was not to impose on the interaction
of the autonomous individuals, but simply to oversee the interactions and
enforce remedies only when one party is entrenched in “universal attitudes”
or norms.254 One small step closer to the societal reach of “public law”
litigation, traditional litigation clarified the law and shaped future behavior
of similarly situated parties.255 The position of the trial judge was
subjugated to the point of “passivity” on three fronts: first, appellate courts
were given heightened status in line with the idea that litigation was a way
to clarify the law; second, because “the immediate impact of the judgment
was confined to the parties”; and third, because there was a very limited
conception of relief and a strong presumption for money damages.256
The “public law model” cuts against many of the characteristics aligned
with the traditional conception of adjudication. Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority257 is a paradigmatic example of “public law” litigation in
the context of housing segregation.258 The plaintiffs, African-American
tenants of and applicants for public housing, sued the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) and HUD on behalf of all similarly situated parties and
challenged the constitutional validity of the site selection policy used by
CHA.259 They claimed that CHA and HUD, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, “intentionally chose sites for family public housing and
adopted tenant assignment procedures . . . for the purpose of maintaining
existing patterns of residential separation of races in Chicago.”260 The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed HUD as a
defendant, but granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against
252. See Chayes, supra note 23, at 1285.
253. Id.
254. Id. (noting that even Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was viewed
as “an outgrowth of the judicial duty to decide otherwise-existing private disputes”).
255. See id.
256. See id. at 1286–87.
257. 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970).
258. Id. at 307–08 (describing the history of the litigation); see Gautreaux v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding CHA liable for intentional
racial discrimination in public housing site selection); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (entering remedial order judgment), aff’d, Gautreaux,
436 F.2d at 313; see also Schuck, supra note 66, at 319 (noting that Gautraux is one of only
a few housing desegregation cases that has succeeded in moving a substantial number of
blacks to previously white suburbs).
259. Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 908.
260. Id.
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CHA in February of 1969.261 The court found that while CHA’s selection
was not “necessarily motivated by racial animus,” “a deliberate policy to
separate the races cannot be justified by the good intentions with which
other laudable goals are pursued.”262 The court ordered that within twenty
days the parties should formulate “a comprehensive plan to prohibit the
future use and to remedy the past effects of CHA’s unconstitutional site
selection and tenant assignment procedures.”263
Five months after the court ordered summary judgment on behalf of the
plaintiffs, having conferred with both the plaintiffs and CHA, the court
issued a judgment order.264 The judgment required CHA to purchase and
construct low-rise buildings and distribute them across all
neighborhoods.265 The order also included a requirement that CHA assign
tenants of all races throughout Chicago neighborhoods in hopes of allowing
African Americans to move into predominately white neighborhoods.266
The judgment was met with significant “political resistance [which]
impeded the program’s implementation” and eighteen years after the initial
judgment the court appointed a receiver to administer the order.267
Although HUD was dismissed by the trial court in 1969, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that HUD was improperly
dismissed as a defendant and was liable for the CHA-implemented site
selection program.268 The court ordered that HUD fund a program aimed at
opening up housing barriers and allowing inner-city African Americans to
move into neighborhoods outside of the Chicago city limits. HUD’s appeal
to the Supreme Court was denied. This marked the first time the Court
upheld an interdistrict remedy in a segregation case.269

261. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971) (granting Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment), aff’d, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
262. Gautreax, 296 F. Supp. at 914. The CHA claimed that the ‘racial character of the
neighborhood’ was never a factor in the selection of a suitable site. Id. at 914. Furthermore,
they claimed that so called “White sites” had been selected at the initial stage of site
selection and the eventual selection of sites in highly concentrated African American
neighborhoods reflected the officials intentions to further low cost housing in those
neighborhoods and combat urban blight. Id.
263. Id.
264. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
265. Id. at 738–39 (stipulating that not more than one-third of the housing units be located
in the “General Public Housing Area of the City of Chicago,” defined as all areas with less
than thirty percent non-white population).
266. See id. at 737–43.
267. Schuck, supra note 66, at 320 (discussing the history of the Gautreax litigation).
268. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971). Citing to Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 (1958), the court reasoned that HUD’s efforts to desegregate Chicago
were equivalent to the local school board’s efforts in Aaron. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 738.
The school board in Aaron was held liable when it “abandoned [plans to desegregate the
Little Rock, Arkansas schools] in the face of stiff community and state governmental
resistance.” Id. HUD was not absolved from liability because of similar “stiff community
and state governmental resistance.” See id. at 739–40 (holding the HUD Secretary liable).
269. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299 (1976) (holding that “[t]he relevant
geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is the Chicago housing
market, not the Chicago city limits”).
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In contrast to the “private law model,” the role of the trial court in
“public law” litigation, as is evident throughout the Gautreaux litigation, is
elevated. The trial court does more than simply apply the law handed down
by the appellate courts—it is the architect of a complicated remedial
scheme. The Gautreaux litigation featured private parties suing on behalf
of not only themselves but everyone else similarly situated.270 The relief
sought and received in Gautreaux did more than provide the plaintiffs and
similarly situated parties with one-time compensation for past harms.271
The Gautreaux litigation had the effect of restructuring the way CHA and
HUD conduct housing programs.272 The benefits are theoretically available
to not only the plaintiffs and similarly situated parties today, but to all
similarly situated parties in the future.
Professor Chayes acknowledged that the characteristics of “public law”
litigation are far from static and that it is difficult to classify a given model
in a bipolar public versus private dichotomy. However, Professor Chayes
developed a list of characteristics that are often present in “public law”
litigation:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily by
the court and parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and
legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form logically
derived from the substantive liability and confined in its impact to the immediate
parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly
remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons including
absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its
administration requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement of
governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible fact
evaluation but for organizing and shaping litigation to ensure a just and viable
outcome.
(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals
about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.273

It is not clear where Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions stand
relative to Professor Chayes’ “public law” litigation paradigm. The average
action brought under the qui tam provisions of the FCA has many
components that fit squarely within the “private law” model. Putting aside
the derivative component of qui tam, the action is very similar to common
law fraud.274 The government is simply seeking redress for a wrong

270. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
271. See Schuck, supra note 66, at 319–21.
272. Id. at 321.
273. Chayes, supra note 23, at 1302.
274. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (comparing an action under the FCA to
common law fraud).

1406

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

committed in a private contractual dealing.275 The action has nothing to do
with restructuring social institutions; in fact, it is the preeminent social
institution itself, the federal government, seeking redress.276 Additionally,
the redress sought is purely monetary: the government seeks compensation
from the fraudulent party in an amount three times more than the damage
caused by the fraudulent act.277 The trial judge is subjugated to a role of
applying the law handed down to her from the appellate courts: she simply
types the damages figure the jury comes up with into a calculator and
multiplies by three.
The Anti-Discrimination Center-type action is not the average action
brought under the qui tam provisions of the FCA.278 Although the claim
was brought under the pretext of a qui tam claim, the Center was only
incidentally concerned with (1) being rewarded under relator compensation
provisions of the FCA and (2) returning money to the government.279 The
Center brought the action as a way of achieving redress for all citizens of
Westchester—especially those who had not been given access to fair
housing.280 The treble damages provisions of the FCA motivated
Westchester to settle with the United States and the Center.281 This allowed
the United States and the Center to negotiate a settlement that included
strict requirements that Westchester comply with their AFFH duties.282
Judge Cote was not relegated to applying law but was involved in
approving the complex settlement.283 Depending on its success, the
settlement could improve life for residents in Westchester.284 Furthermore,
the suit brought by the Center had a governmental restructuring component
and is likely to have effects on the way HUD and Westchester conduct their
affairs.285
It is clear that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions have many
characteristics that fit within the “public law” litigation paradigm. In order
to determine how successful the Center’s action, and future AntiDiscrimination Center-type actions, might be at improving conditions for
Westchester residents, remedying the problem of residential segregation,
and restructuring institutional players such as Westchester and HUD, this
275. See supra notes 5, 198 (explaining the basic components of a qui tam suit).
276. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (stating that qui tam actions are
derivative in nature and the relator is suing on behalf of the government).
277. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (explaining the FCA’s treble damages
provision).
278. See supra note 6 (describing a more typical qui tam action in which the government
recovered money damages from individuals caught in a tax evasion scheme).
279. See Allen, supra note 14, at 3 (describing his firm’s action against Westchester as
desegregation litigation).
280. See id.
281. See Joseph Berger, In Westchester, an Open Plea to Accept a Housing Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/nyregion/
18spano.html (stating that members of the Westchester legislature “believed they had no
choice because penalties for not approving it would amount to $180 million”).
282. See supra notes 246–51 (describing the settlement).
283. See supra notes 246–51 (describing the settlement).
284. See supra note 244 (describing segregated conditions prior to the settlement).
285. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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Note turns to some of the criticisms of the public law model and determines
how Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions stand up to the criticism.
1. Solving Structural Problems Within HUD and Municipalities
The settlement in Anti-Discrimination Center has elements of a structural
remedy.286 Through the qui tam settlement, the United States and the
Center have changed the relationship between Westchester and HUD.
Arguably, the Anti-Discrimination Center action, along with the settlement,
has changed the relationship between HUD and all CDBG grantees. There
has been much ink spilled on whether this type of judicial action is
proper287 or whether judicial action in this area is effective at restructuring
executive agencies and the like.288 Qui tam does not bring too much new to
the table in terms of whether judicial action in this area is proper. But as
part of the discussion in Part II.B and III.B, we will examine the
effectiveness of judicial action and determine whether some of the unique
qualities of the qui tam suit have a positive or negative effect on the
viability of the qui tam action to provide structural change in institutions.289

286. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1979)
(defining a “structural suit” as “one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over
values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a
threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements”); Myriam Gilles, An
Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 143, 144 (2003) (identifying “structural reform injunctions” as injunctions that
“enjoin[] the defendant institution from acting in a particular unconstitutional fashion [and]
order[] forward-looking, affirmative steps to prevent future deprivations”).
287. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1307 (1978) (noting the
separation of powers argument against judicial structural reform but concluding “it has
always been hard to classify all government activity into three, and only three, neat and
mutually exclusive categories”).
288. Compare FISS, supra note 287, at 90 (“The average judge turned out to be more
heroic than the average legislator.”), with Gilles, supra note 286, at 146 n.16 (noting that
extra-legal “discomfort with the role of the judge is most evident in legislation that aims to
limit the ability of litigants to bring claims seeking structural relief”). It could be argued that
the failure of Congress to include a direct remedy for violations of AFFH duties reflected
“discomfort” on the part of Congress that parties such as the Center would bring actions such
as Anti-Discrimination Center. See supra Part I.B.3 (stating that there is no direct action
available to enforce AFFH obligations).
289. After a flood of structural reform litigation following Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court has become increasingly hostile to structural reform
and injunctions. See Gilles, supra note 286, at 145 (acknowledging a decrease in structural
injunctions being brought). This point is contrasted by a reality described by Professor
Myriam Gilles of Cardozo School of Law, “There continue to exist sufficiently egregious,
systemic constitutional issues that inspire (or could inspire) the requisite breadth of support
and depth of reformist zeal to motor the machinery of the structural reform injunction.” Id.;
see also Myriam Gilles, Representational Standing: United States ex rel. Stevens and the
Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 316 (2001) (noting that the decision
“marks a radical reconfiguration of the landscape facing legislators seeking to vest private
actors with standing to enforce federal laws”). Professor Gilles would likely agree that this
point also applies to statutory civil rights such as AFFH duties. Thus, it could be argued that
the Anti-Discrimination Center action acts as an expansion of the standing requirement,
which allowed the Center to get around artificially strict standing rules.
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2. Representation of the Parties
In an article entitled The Supreme Court 1978 Term,290 Yale Law School
Professor Owen Fiss remarked, “[o]nce we take the group perspective on
the victim, it also becomes clear that the spokesman need not—indeed
cannot—be the victim.”291 Professor Fiss touches on a key point: in public
law litigation the party structure is “sprawling and amorphous”—the
plaintiffs are those before the court, those similarly situated, and those who
will be similarly situated in the future.292 Furthermore, an individual victim
may not want to come forward, as they are in “such a vulnerable
position.”293 There are problems of representation in “public law” litigation
and Fiss remarks that “[a]s an affirmative matter this means that the court
must determine whether the interests of the victim group are adequately
represented.”294 This potential problem for public law must be examined in
the qui tam context because the next relator might seize the chance to bring
home their share of the reward and not care about enforcing the AFFH
duties.295 This issue will be discussed in Parts II.B and III.B.
3. Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation
As discussed in Part I.A.2, housing markets are complicated organisms
that have developed powers to remain segregated despite prohibition of
discrimination and very slight racial preferences.296 In a piece entitled
Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation,297 Yale
Law School Professor Peter Schuck explores the interaction between the
complexity of the housing market and judicial efforts to desegregate
communities.298 In analyzing the successes and failures of three prominent
housing desegregation cases, including the previously mentioned
Gautreaux case, Schuck made four principal observations: (1) the housing
market’s “persuasive influence over housing choices” often “constrains”
and “distorts” attempts by the government and judiciary to influence the
choices,299 (2) “a ubiquitous classism rejects the idea that people should
have a right to live in a neighborhood they cannot afford,” (3) “politically
mobilized communities strongly oppose the kinds of diversity the courts
have mandated,” and (4) “courts possess only the crudest, most limited

290. 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
291. Fiss, supra note 286, at 19.
292. See Chayes, supra note 23, at 1302.
293. See Fiss, supra note 286, at 20.
294. See id.
295. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (discussing the derivative nature of
the qui tam suit).
296. Schuck, supra note 66, at 366; see also supra Part I.A.2 (describing two theories that
may explain the staying power of residential segregation).
297. 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2002).
298. Schuck, supra note 66, at 289 (discussing “how the law has defined and handled the
goal of residential diversity”).
299. See supra notes 54–71 (discussing two ways the housing markets distort
governmental intervention).
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tools for [creating] diversity amid these obstacles.”300 Schuck found that
when courts use “command-and-control” approaches in which they order
very specific decrees and are not reticent to the very political nature of their
entrenchment into the housing market, they are often met with hostility and
are not successful in desegregating the community.301 When courts impose
their will on a community without recognizing the strong backlash that this
is likely to create, the remedy often fails to improve conditions in the
community. Although Schuck focuses on remedy, this theory is applicable
to the question of whether qui tam and enforcement of AFFH duties will
succeed in positively impacting the problem of residential segregation—to
be discussed further in Parts III and IV.
II. DISSECTING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ARE QUI TAM ACTIONS BASED ON
STATE OR MUNICIPAL “ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS” BARRED?
Part I framed the problem of residential segregation and introduced the
main tool used to combat segregation’s continued existence—AFFH duties
imposed on HUD and HUD grantees. Especially pertinent to the subjects to
which the Note now turns, Part I.D presented a circuit split that has the
potential to decrease the applicability of qui tam actions to enforce AFFH
duties. Part II analyzes each side of this conflict.
Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions function at the crossroad of two
complicated statutory schemes.302 Along one axis of this crossroads, a
combination of the FHA and regulations imposed by HUD, requires HUD
grantees to conduct an AI to fair housing, to analyze the impact of racial
impediments, and finally to certify that this analysis has been conducted in
compliance with HUD regulations as a precondition of receiving funds.303
Along the other axis, the qui tam provisions of the FCA attempt to filter out
parasitic actions brought by opportunistic relators. In order for an AntiDiscrimination Center-type action to succeed, the relator must avoid the
public disclosure bar by successfully arguing that the AI report garnered
through a FOIA-type request is not an “administrative report” under prong
two of the public disclosure analysis or, alternatively, argue that the relator
is an “original source” under prong three.304
This section will examine three approaches taken in interpreting prong
two and the application of the meaning of “administrative report” to a state
or municipal report such as an AI report. The Third Circuit has held that a
state or municipal report garnered through a FOIA-type request is not an
“administrative report” because § 3730(e)(4)(A) provides a narrow
300. Schuck, supra note 66, at 366.
301. Id. at 368 (noting a judge’s “use [of a] simple dualistic categories to explain complex
phenomena” and the resulting failure to integrate the community).
302. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608 (2006); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–3733.
303. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at i–iii (describing the consolidated
plan and the certification that communities will affirmatively further fair housing as “a
condition of receiving Federal funds”).
304. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text.
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definition of the bar and such a reading is consistent with the “purpose and
tenor” of the 1986 Amendments.305 The Eighth Circuit, in finding that
reports garnered through FOIA-type requests are “administrative reports,”
argues that the Third Circuit approach leads to “anomalous” results.306 The
Ninth Circuit sides with the Eighth Circuit and finds that the state/federal
distinction advanced by the Third Circuit is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit
precedent and legislative intent behind the FCA.307
A. The Third Circuit Approach
The Third Circuit was the first of the three circuit courts to weigh in on
the issue with its ruling in United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of
Delaware.308 Dunleavy, the relator, claimed that an agreement between the
County of Delaware (the County) and the federal government required the
County to follow certain HUD regulations that limited the ways in which
the County could spend HUD funds and imposed a requirement to submit
an annual Grantee Performance Report (GPR) to HUD.309 He further
alleged that the County violated this agreement when it acquired a tract of
land with HUD funds that was not eligible to be purchased under the
agreement.310 Dunleavy claimed that this action triggered the reporting
requirement provisions of the agreement: when the County failed to report
the purchase and return the HUD funds, it effectively fraudulently accepted
the funds from the government.311 The County countered that the facts of
this purchase were not only “publicly disclosed” under the first prong of the
public disclosure bar analysis, but were also disclosed, under prong two,
through an enumerated mode of disclosure—an “administrative report.”312
The disclosure occurred in a GPR that the County was required to submit to
HUD as part of the reporting scheme mandated in the agreement between
the County and HUD.313 The report was fraudulent because it contained
the misrepresented state of facts: non-disclosure of the impermissible
purchase of the tract of land.314 The Third Circuit used four theories to
support its finding that the GPR is not an “administrative report” as used in
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).

305. See infra notes 308–46 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 347–68 and accompanying text.
307. See infra notes 357–73 and accompanying text.
308. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 745–46 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that a county report is not an “administrative report” as used in
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), but not citing to any precedent on this point).
309. Id. at 735–36.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 736–37.
312. Id. at 743–44.
313. Id. at 735–36.
314. Id. at 743.
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1. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) as an Exhaustive List
There is circuit court precedent for the proposition that the list of
enumerated sources in § 3730(e)(4)(A) is exhaustive.315 The Third Circuit
argued that construction of the list, and more specifically the fact that
Congress did not qualify the list through the use of “such as” or “for
example,” allows the inference that the list is exhaustive.316 The court used
the exclusive character of the list to transition to more specific arguments
for a narrow definition of administrative reports: “[t]he only way to bring
the GPR, prepared by the County, with, the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A) is
for the GPR to be considered an ‘administrative . . . report.’”317
After deciding that the public disclosure bar only applies to those modes
of disclosure that are enumerated in § 3730(e)(4)(A), the court turned to
how to interpret “administrative report” as used in § 3730(e)(4)(A).
2. Doctrine of Noscitur a Sociis
The unqualified use of “administrative reports” in § 3730(e)(4)(A) makes
it difficult to determine the intentions of Congress.318 The court points out
that Congress has “provided no clear legislative intent or meaning for it in
the FCA.”319 There are no distinctions between federal and state
administrative reports in the statute.320 In some of these circumstances,
where a “word [is] usable in many contexts and with various shades of
meaning,” the Supreme Court has turned to the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis.321 The doctrine allows the meaning of a given word to be enhanced
by the surrounding words.322 For example, in Jarecki v. G. D. Searle &
Co.,323 the Supreme Court used the doctrine to determine what an otherwise
ambiguous use of “discovery” meant within the context of a tax statute.324
315. Cf. United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1995)
(noting that the enumerated modes of disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A) are the only modes that
trigger the public disclosure bar); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318,
323 (2d Cir. 1992) (arguing that the list in § 3730(e)(4)(A) is exclusive); United States ex
rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting the absence of the
words “such as” or “for example” and arguing that there is nothing to “indicate that [the
enumerated modes] are only examples of the types of ‘public disclosure’ to which the
jurisdictional bar would apply”); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913
F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting the district court’s argument that § 3730(e)(4)(A)
denies jurisdiction over “actions based on disclosures other than those specified”).
316. See Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 744 (quoting Williams, 931 F.2d at 1499–1500).
317. Id. (omission in original).
318. Id. at 745.
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1839 (2008) (applying “the
common sense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise
content by the neighboring words with which it is associated”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys.,
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004) (remarking that interpretation of a single word is not
a process by which an abstract meaning of the word is sought; instead, “we are seeking the
meaning of the whole phrase”).
321. Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
322. Id. (stating that “a word is known by the company it keeps”).
323. 367 U.S. 303 (1961).
324. Id. at 306–07.

1412

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

The Court used the entire list found in the tax statute—“exploration,”
“discovery,” and “prospecting”—to come to the conclusion that
“discovery” only applies to “discovery” of oil, gas, and mineral
resources.325
The Third Circuit applied this doctrine to the “administrative report” as
used in § 3730(e)(4)(A): “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media.”326 Focusing on
the statute’s reference to Congress and “Government Accounting Office,”
the court noted that both referents are entities of the federal government.327
The court found “it hard to believe that the drafters of this provision
intended the word ‘administrative’ to refer to both state and federal reports
when it lies sandwiched between modifiers which are unquestionably
federal in character.”328 Of course, the bread of the Third Circuit’s
“sandwich” can only be considered to be a modifier when the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis is applied, which is not something other circuits are
comfortable doing.329
Application of noscitur a sociis allowed the Third Circuit to conclude
that § 3730(e)(4)(A) only implicated federal “administrative reports.”330
Since the GPR was “prepared by” the County, the court concluded that it
did not come within the meaning of federal “administrative reports.”331 It
is true that the report was “prepared by” the County, but it was prepared for
the federal government.332 This second point is not mentioned in the
opinion, but is highlighted by both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.333
3. “Information Dynamic”334
In addition to using statutory interpretation, the Third Circuit found
functional support for the distinction between federal and state
administrative reports. The FCA was designed as a tool to ferret out fraud
against the government.335 The qui tam provisions reflect a view that the

325. Id. at 306–12.
326. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
327. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir.
1997).
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“We reject the Third Circuit’s textual approach and conclude that Medicaid compliance
audits and audit reports conducted and prepared by the state agency authorized to administer
this cooperative federal/state program are public disclosures within the meaning of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).”).
330. See Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745.
331. Id.
332. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
333. United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2006); see
Hays, 325 F.3d at 988.
334. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745 (3d Cir. 1997).
335. See supra notes 177–82 and accompanying text (describing the reason Congress
enacted the FCA).
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government has imperfect information on where the fraud is occurring.336
Furthermore, in a situation such as Dunleavy, where the party accused of
the fraud is required to submit reports to the government, the reports “have
been compiled and produced by a party whose principal motivation
(assuming the truth of the fraud claim) is the elimination of the paper
trail.”337 The court inferred from the general purpose of the FCA that this
was a case where Congress would want to allow the qui tam action.338 The
court did not want to create a scenario in which entities that enter into
contracts with the government could effectively absolve themselves from
FCA repercussions by submitting false reports to the government.339
4. The “Purpose and Tenor” of the 1986 Amendments340
The FCA has been through two major revisions since its enactment in
1863.341 Each revision was an attempt by Congress to find the right
balance between incentivizing beneficial relators and discouraging
opportunistic relators.342 The 1986 amendments reflected Congress’s view
that the 1943 amendments instituted a version of the public disclosure bar
that prevented too many beneficial qui tam suits from being initiated.343
Prior to the 1986 amendments, the standard barred qui tam suits “based
upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States.”344
The Dunleavy court reasoned that barring qui tam suits “based on” county
reports would be an effective repeal of the 1986 amendments and a
reversion to the public disclosure bar scheme of the 1943 amendments.345
Similar to the “information dynamic” reasoning, the court did not think
Congress intended to create a situation where simply because the report is
in the possession of the federal government, the party committing the fraud
is absolved. This scenario was especially troublesome to the court when the
government files the papers away and “there is [no] reason to give them
close attention.”346 Based on the confluence of these four theories
presented by the Dunleavy court, the Third Circuit seems committed to
ensuring that the FCA is an effective tool to ferret out fraud.

336. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745 (noting that FCA reflects a “perceived . . . existence of ‘a
conspiracy of silence’ to defraud the federal government”).
337. Id.
338. See id. at 745–46.
339. See id. at 745.
340. Id.
341. See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text (reviewing the history of FCA
amendments).
342. See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text (explaining the criticisms of the
public disclosure bar in the 1943 amendments).
344. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, Pub. L. No. 78-215, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006)).
345. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 746 (“The expansion of the FCA’s definition of
‘administrative report’ to state and local government reports would in effect return us to the
unduly restrictive ‘government knowledge’ standard.”).
346. Id.
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B. The Eighth Circuit Approach
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit court to decide whether state or
municipal reports constituted “administrative reports” within the meaning
of § 3730(e)(4)(A).347 In Hays, the court distinguished and partially
rejected the Dunleavy reasoning, determining that Medicare and Medicaid
audit reports produced by a nursing home and submitted to the federal
government constituted “administrative reports” and therefore FCA actions
“based upon” these reports were barred.348
1. Dunleavy Leads to “Anomalous” Results
The Hays court rejected the Dunleavy court’s textual approach to the
issue based on the belief that the strict federal/state dichotomy produces
“anomalous results.”349 When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it
explicitly defined “claim” in such a way to include Medicare or Medicaid
reports submitted to state agencies within the definition.350 This was done
in an effort to allow FCA actions to be brought where “there is significant
Federal regulation and involvement.”351 Through the definition of “claim,”
Congress opened up FCA actions to a wide range of those situations,
including those in which the federal government is fulfilling the claim.352
The inquiry relevant to determining whether or not a request for payment is
a “claim” within the meaning of the statute is whether the federal
government is “significant[ly]” involved in the program. The court
reasoned that it would not be consistent to ignore the federal/state
distinction for purposes of the “claim” inquiry and make the same
distinction determinative for purposes of the “administrative report”
inquiry.
2. “Prepared By or at the Behest of the Relevant Federal Agency”
Like the other circuit courts, the Hays court acknowledged that the
enumerated modes of public disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A) constitute an
exhaustive list and is therefore required to come up with a theory as to what
is included within the definition of “administrative reports.”353 The court
looked to two cases that involved parties other than the federal government
that produced audit reports “at the behest of” the federal government.354 In
Minnesota Association of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System

347. United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2003) (remarking
that the application of “administrative reports” has lead to “divergent judicial
interpretation”).
348. See id. at 989.
349. Id. at 988.
350. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Sec. 2, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153,
3154 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)).
351. Hays, 325 F.3d at 988.
352. Id. at 985.
353. Id. at 988.
354. Id.
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Corp.,355 the Eighth Circuit determined that an audit conducted by a private
insurer as part of a program administered by the federal government
constituted an “administrative audit”—which is one of the enumerated
modes of disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A).356 Reliance on this case is
questionable, as the Nurse Anesthetists court provides no support for its
reasoning and mentions it only in passing—the court determines that the
audit conducted by the private insurance company is not relevant to the
appeal.357 In United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp.,358
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia expressed a view that an
audit prepared by an outside accounting firm at the “behest of” the federal
government satisfied the public disclosure bar.359 The parties in Schwedt
did not argue that the audit did not constitute an “administrative report” and
therefore reliance on this case is also questionable.360
The Eighth Circuit’s strongest argument is a functional analysis of how
the FCA fits into the Medicaid fraud detection scheme.361 The court
described Medicaid as “a cooperative federal-state program through which
the federal government provides financial assistance to help states furnish
health care to the poor.”362 Medicaid regulations specify that states must
audit, records of those parties claiming payment through Medicaid.363
Furthermore, if the federal government receives a complaint of fraud, it
defers to the states to investigate, “setting the stage for either federal or state
criminal or civil enforcement actions.”364 The Hays court distinguished
Dunleavy on the grounds that the grantee compliance audits, which
complement the GPR at issue in Dunleavy, are conducted by the federal
government and not the states, as is the case with Medicaid audits.365 The
Hays court focused on the function the audit report plays in the reporting
scheme and found that since the Medicaid reporting scheme relies on states
instead of the federal government, it satisfies the public disclosure bar.366
The Hays court accurately distinguished Dunleavy, but failed to fully

355. 276 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2002).
356. Id. at 1044.
357. See id. at 1043–44 (describing an audit conducted by a private insurer as an
“administrative audit” within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A) in a sentence that is explaining
the defendant’s position on appeal and not expressing the courts view on whether an audit by
a private insurance company should be considered an “administrative audit”).
358. 39 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 1999).
359. Id. at 31–33.
360. See id. at 31–36 (focusing on the “allegation or transaction language” and “based
upon” of § 3730(e)(4)(A) and not discussing whether the audit constituted an “administrative
audit”).
361. See United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2003)
(describing the Medicaid fraud detection scheme).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. (“Congress did not delegate [the audit program at issue in Dunleavy] to a state
agency, as is the case with Medicaid.”).
366. Id. at 989.
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explain why this distinction matters.367 It seems as though the Hays court
made a judgment that the FCA is less important to the Medicaid fraud
detection scheme than it is to HUD’s fraud detection scheme in
Dunleavy.368
C. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hays through
its decision in United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo.369 In Bly-Magee,
the relator, Bly-Magee, accused the California Department of Rehabilitation
(CDR) of defrauding the federal government by “violat[ing] federal
procurement standards in awarding contracts, forc[ing] the Government to
‘purchase unnecessary and duplicative services’,” and “falsely certif[ying]
that [CDR] had conducted audits.”370 Bly-Magee brought a series of suits
under the FCA, but at issue in this instance of the series was whether the
“public disclosure” of facts underlying the action in a published audit report
produced by the California State Auditor constituted an “administrative
report” under the FCA—which would trigger the public disclosure bar.371
1. Likelihood of Discovering Fraud is “Heightened”
The Ninth Circuit previously decided that state and local administrative
hearings were sources of public disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A).372 From
this precedent, the Court reasoned that it would be incongruous to apply a
federal versus state distinction for “administrative audits” but not for
Buttressing this point with functional
“administrative hearings.”373
reasoning similar to that found in Hays, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he
likelihood that the information will be brought to the federal government’s
attention is heightened in cases . . . where the audited program is connected
significantly to federal regulations and funds.”374 The court noted that
CDR provides services through federal and state funds within the context of
federal legislation. “Essentially, CDR’s operation depends on federal
funding and compliance with federal regulations.”375 Furthermore, the
federal regulation requires the state to form a committee to supply progress
367. See id. (stating “while we do not disagree with the Third Circuit’s decision in
Dunleavy, we conclude the court ruled more broadly than necessary in stating that a state
agency disclosure may never be an ‘administrative . . . report [or] audit’ for purposes of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A),” but not explaining why Dunleavy does not fit in the functional description
of the Medicaid program (alteration in original)).
368. Cf. id.
369. 470 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We agree with the Eighth Circuit and now hold
that the second category of sources includes non-federal reports, audits, and investigations.”)
370. Id. at 917 (quoting the complaint).
371. Id.
372. See A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“The extensive public agency proceedings conducted by the Counties plainly fall within the
ambit of ‘administrative hearing[s]’ under § 3730(e)(4)(A).” (alteration in original)).
373. Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 918 (“The federal government is no less likely to obtain
information from a state administrative audit than it is from a state administrative hearing.”).
374. Id. at 918–19.
375. Id. at 919.
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reports to the federal government.376 The Bly-Magee court viewed the facts
in that case as more closely aligned with Hays than Dunleavy.377 Like the
Hays court, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that when the fraud detection
scheme heavily relies on state participation, the public disclosure bar is
triggered.378
2. Dunleavy Does Not Lead to Anomalous Results
Noting that the Third Circuit in Dunleavy feared creating a situation in
which the state or municipal agency could absolve itself from liability by
submitting a false report, the Bly-Magee court did not think these concerns
applied to its facts.379 The Dunleavy court thought that an agency might
craft a report in such a way as to disclose enough facts to trigger the public
disclosure bar, but conceal other facts that would tip off the relevant federal
agency.380 The Ninth Circuit first distinguished the facts of Dunleavy from
those of Bly-Magee by arguing that in Bly-Magee the state auditor who
conducts the audit was independent from the report producing agency.381
This seems to undercut the Dunleavy reasoning as applied to Bly-Magee,
but the Ninth Circuit was not finished with the critique of the Dunleavy
“information dynamic” reasoning.382 The Ninth Circuit proceeded to
astutely note that the situation feared by Dunleavy was not likely to
occur.383 In order for the public disclosure bar to be triggered, the
“allegations or transactions” underlying the fraud must appear in a public
disclosure.384 It is exceedingly unlikely that a state or municipal agency
would be able to toe the very narrow line between disclosing enough
information to truly disclose the “allegations or transactions” of the fraud
without tipping off the authorities to the fraud.385 The court noted that
“[t]he public disclosure of ‘mere information’ relating to the claims was
insufficient to trigger a jurisdictional bar to the False Claims suit.”386

376. Id.
377. See id. at 918–19 (distinguishing Dunleavy and analogizing to Hays).
378. Id. at 919. (9th Cir. 2006) (analogizing to Hays because of the “significant federal
regulation and cooperation”).
379. Id. (“Finally, our interpretation of § 3730(e)(4)(A) does not create the anomalous
situation feared by the court in Dunleavy.”).
380. See id. (characterizing Dunleavy); see also supra notes 308–14 and accompanying
text (describing the facts of Dunleavy).
381. Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 919; cf. supra notes 308–14 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 315–20 and accompanying text.
383. Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 919 (“The court feared that legitimate qui tam suits thus
could be barred on the ground that the allegations were disclosed in reports or audits
produced by the entity accused of fraud. This fear is unfounded in this case . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
384. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (providing that “[n]o court
shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions” in the enumerated modes of public disclosure); see also supra
note 211 (explaining how much information is required to constitute “public disclosure”).
385. See Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 919.
386. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS REPORTS SHOULD SURVIVE THE PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE BAR
Part I supplied a primer in residential segregation, the AFFH duties, and
how qui tam might be used to enforce those duties. Part II set up the circuit
split conflict over whether Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions should
be allowed to use the qui tam mechanism. Part III will conclude that these
actions should survive the public disclosure bar.
The ability of relators such as the Center to bring qui tam actions against
county and municipal authorities to enforce AFFH obligations depends on
the relators’ ability to use the authority’s AI report as the basis for liability.
The FCA was enacted to encourage those with information of fraud against
the government to come forward, but the countervailing goal of limiting
parasitic relators from beating the government to the courthouse led to the
eventual enactment of the modern public disclosure bar.387 The public
disclosure bar prevents qui tam suits that are “based on” public disclosure
of “administrative reports” within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).388 The
next court to decide an Anti-Discrimination Center-type action will be
confronted with the issue of whether AI reports constitute “administrative
reports.” This Note will proceed to argue that the next court should follow
Judge Cote’s lead and hold that AI reports are not “administrative reports”
and are therefore available to be used as a basis for a qui tam action to
enforce AFFH obligations.
All three circuits to consider the issue recognize that modes of disclosure
listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A) cannot apply to all “administrative reports” or
“audits.”389 These words are simply too broad by themselves and would
include too much under the public disclosure bar.390 There are very few
clues hidden in the statute and virtually no legislative history on what
“administrative reports” means.391 The courts are forced to determine
whether Congress would have intended to include a given mode of
disclosure based on the purposes behind the FCA and the public disclosure
bar.392 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits make strong arguments for including
reports produced by the states and submitted to the federal government
within the FCA’s public disclosure bar. However, it is highly unlikely that
Congress intended the courts to make a state/federal distinction in the case
of federal housing programs—but not in the case of federal healthcare
programs. Thus, we must come to a definitive answer on whether state
administrative reports are “administrative reports” within the meaning of §
3730(e)(4)(A).
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits make their strongest arguments when they
attempt to distinguish their respective cases from Dunleavy through a
comparison of the reporting schemes involved in both cases. Dunleavy
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text.
See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 313–15, 353, 379–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text.
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dealt with a HUD GPR produced by a county government and supplied to
HUD for potential auditing.393 Hays and Bly-Magee dealt with an audit
report produced by a state health agency, submitted to the federal
government with the potential to be audited by a state auditor.394 The Hays
and Bly-Magee courts correctly identify a major difference in the reporting
structure in that a state auditor, independent from the state agency that
prepares the report, is responsible for auditing the report and detecting
fraud.395 However the distinction is immaterial when analyzed in context
with the purpose of the FCA.
Underlying the reasoning in Hays seems to be an assumption that the
federally mandated reporting structure was sufficient to detect fraud and did
not need to be supplemented by the FCA.396 This interpretation seems to
confuse the relationship between the FCA, the FCA’s public disclosure bar,
and the purpose underlying each. First and foremost, the purpose of the
FCA is to increase the federal government’s ability to recover money lost to
fraud.397 It was not created to supplement an already sophisticated federal
fraud-detecting scheme. Instead, it was an acknowledgement of the fact
that the government was ineffective at detecting fraud.398 The modern
public disclosure bar was developed because parasitic Marcus-type actions
were recognized as undesirable.399 The public disclosure bar functions as
an exception to the general rule that the government wants to discover
fraud.400 The exceptions laid out in § 3730(e)(4)(A) should be interpreted
within the context of what Congress intended to create with the
exceptions—a mechanism to prevent relators from bringing parasitic qui
tam suits.401 The Hays court seems to incorrectly analyze the issue from
the opposite perspective and positions the inquiry as determining whether
fraud detection is needed in a given situation.402
Framing the inquiry of interpreting § 3730(e)(4)(A) from the perspective
of whether a given mode of disclosure creates a substantial likelihood of
parasitic actions aligns with the purpose of the public disclosure bar.
Viewed in this way, there does not seem to be a reason to be especially
worried about administrative reports that are produced by state agencies. In
the case of administrative reports produced by the federal government, it is
assumed that the government has knowledge of the report, which leads to a
high likelihood that an FCA action “based upon” such reports would be
parasitic. In the case of AI reports, there is less reason to be suspicious of
potentially parasitic claims. The AI report is never actually submitted to
393. See supra notes 308–14 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 348, 370 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 361–67 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 182–93 and accompanying text.
400. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (stating the exception as
opposed to the general rule).
401. See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 355–68 and accompanying text.
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HUD. HUD requires that the analysis be conducted and lays out specific
requirements, such as the requirement to analyze racial impediments, but
never audits the report.
Although this Note rejects the Hays court’s “where do we need fraud
detection” reasoning, such reasoning supports a determination that AI
reports and other similar reports should not be barred. HUD is a massive
federal organization with an annual budget of nearly forty-two billion
dollars. Almost eight billion dollars are distributed by CDBG programs
through an extremely complicated fund granting mechanism.403 First, the
would-be grantees conduct an AI, produce and submit a Consolidated Plan,
submit certifications that they will “affirmatively further fair housing,” and
submit more certifications that they will comply with a long list of other
regulations. Second, an arcane formula determines whether a given
community will receive funds and, if they are to receive funds, how
much.404 Finally the money is distributed and the grantees are charged with
complying with the complex regulatory scheme.
Qui tam was developed for this exact scenario. The government is
overextended: it has developed a regulatory scheme so complicated that it
could never enforce it. The government is at a disadvantage because the
compliance or non-compliance with the regulations is spread thinly across
fifty states and is extremely nuanced. Take, for example, Westchester’s
non-compliance, which was only evidenced in an AI report and the nonexistence of subsidized housing in predominantly white communities.
Fraud detection is very difficult in these situations. The FCA is needed and
there is no substantial likelihood of parasitic action. HUD is another
example of numerous federal agencies that operate in a similar manner.
Complicated regulations disperse billions of dollars every year. When
states, counties, or municipalities produce reports such as the AI report, the
report should not be barred from being the basis of a qui tam suit. This
situation does not present a high likelihood of producing parasitic suits and
is consistent with the general rule that the FCA is designed to detect fraud
when the government is at an information disadvantage.405
If the problem is analyzed from the perspective of whether the FCA
served its purpose in Anti-Discrimination Center, the answer is almost selfevident. Westchester was in noncompliance for a seven-year period.406
Throughout this period Westchester ignored HUD directives and continued
to perform its AI without considering racial impediments. The government
never received or audited the AI reports and relied on Westchester’s
certification. The information required to detect the fraud was hidden in the
AI report. Only a party in the Center’s position with the requisite
knowledge and motivation to detect the fraud could have alerted the

403. See supra note 2 (explaining the fund granting mechanism).
404. See supra Part I.B–C.
405. See supra notes 335–39 and accompanying text.
406. See Anti-Discrimination Center Press Release, supra note 1 (noting that the
settlement represents seven years of funding).
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government. The next court confronted with an Anti-Discrimination-type
action should allow the AI to form the basis of the qui tam action.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF AFFH DUTIES THROUGH QUI TAM: WHERE DOES
QUI TAM FIT IN THE “PUBLIC LAW” LITIGATION FRAMEWORK?
Part III concluded that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions and the
requisite AI reports garnered through FOIA requests should survive the
FCA’s public disclosure bar.
Part IV analyzes whether AntiDiscrimination-type actions have the potential to succeed as “public law”
litigation.
A. Disadvantages of Using Qui Tam
1. Representation of the Parties
Professor Fiss warned that representation of the victims in “public law”
litigation can be complicated.407 The outcome of the case will affect those
before the court, similarly situated parties, and even parties that are not now
but will be similarly situated in the future.408 In “public law” litigation it is
important for the judge to determine if the victims are properly
represented.409 These concerns are magnified by Anti-Discrimination
Center-type actions.
The qui tam provisions of the FCA provide that anyone can bring an
action in the name of the government so long as they meet the various
requirements of the FCA.410 The FCA was not designed as a civil rights
enforcement mechanism.411 Instead, the government hoped to tap the
public’s knowledge of fraud and resources to litigate on behalf of the
government by providing a substantial monetary reward. This created a
problem beyond Fiss’s worst nightmare:
a situation where the
representative of the injured class has completely divergent interests from
the individuals that make up the injured class.412 Extending this
hypothetical, the relator would initiate the action in the hopes of garnering a
hefty sum of the fraudulent claim. Imagine that this greedy, parasitic413
relator brought the suit against Westchester. With Westchester’s back up
against the wall, facing treble damages amounting to $180 million, the
greedy relator does not settle. Instead of receiving Westchester’s
affirmative guarantee that Westchester will build hundreds of homes and
locate them in compliance with its AFFH duties, the residents of
407. See Fiss, supra note 286, at 20.
408. See supra notes 258–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Gautreaux
litigation).
409. See Fiss, supra note 286, at 20–21.
410. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (discussing the derivative nature of
the qui tam action).
411. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose
behind qui tam).
412. See Fiss, supra note 286, at 21 (discussing the need for interests to be aligned).
413. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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Westchester receive nothing more than a tax increase to pay the treble
damages.
While this example assumes that the government did not decide to
intervene during any stage of the trial, it is not out of the realm of
possibilities:414 the United States did not intervene for the first three years
of the Anti-Discrimination Center litigation.415 Furthermore, the procedural
rule that allows the government to intervene arguably worked to the
Center’s disadvantage at the time of settlement. In approving the
settlement, Judge Cote stipulated that the Monitor charged with assuring
Westchester’s compliance would be appointed at the sole discretion of the
United States. Most recently, the Center has expressed criticism of the
Monitor’s commitment to enforce the settlement exactly as it was written
and signed by the parties. The intervention rule allows the same
government that failed to detect Westchester’s noncompliance for seven
years to have the final say on how the settlement is implemented and strips
the Center of its role in the implementation.416
2. Solving Structural Problems within HUD and Municipalities
Gautreaux is a paradigmatic example of “public law” litigation being
used to restructure institutions.417 The defendants, CHA and HUD, had
intentionally placed minority residents in minority neighborhoods in
violation of the constitutional rights of the residents.418 This action resulted
in true structural change; as a result of the action, both CHA and HUD were
required to significantly change their institutional behavior.419 It might be
argued that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions do not have the reach
required to change institutional behavior to the degree that more traditional
desegregation actions do. In the case of Westchester, the annual grant and
length of the claim period created a large enough penalty that Westchester
was forced to settle.420 It is possible to imagine a municipality with a
smaller annual grant and a shorter false claims period. In this situation, the
municipality might simply pay the treble damages required under the FCA
instead of settling. It is true that if the municipality continues to participate
in HUD programs, then it will likely modify its institutional behavior so
that it will not be liable for a penalty—but the municipality could
alternatively simply stop participating in the HUD program. This is in
contrast to Gautreaux, where an injunctive order was going to be the
remedy if there was a finding of liability.421 It could be argued that the
wrong committed in Gautreaux was more serious, and therefore the more
414. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2006).
415. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
416. See Anti-Discrimination Center Press Release, supra note 1 (noting that the
settlement represents seven years of funding).
417. See supra notes 258–69 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 258–69 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 258–69 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 258–69 and accompanying text.
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substantive remedy makes sense, but nonetheless the ability for the
defendant in a qui tam action simply to pay a fine limits its effectiveness in
effecting structural change.
3. Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation
Professor Schuck distinguishes between a “command-and-control”
remedy that imposes a segregation ideal on a community and a more
political approach that takes into account the resistance that the remedy is
likely to meet.422 Schuck concludes, based on a thorough analysis of
residential segregation cases, that the former—the more authoritarian
remedies—tend not to be successful.423 From this perspective, it might be
argued that the treble damages provision of the FCA actually gave the
United States and the Center too much bargaining power.424 The remedy
achieved by the United States and the Center in the settlement was quite
significant. It required Westchester to build specific numbers of affordable
homes in the very communities that were opposed to affordable housing
being built.425 The opposition is evident by analyzing the distribution of
affordable housing placement during the false claims period and is
supported by Professor Schuck’s observation that “a ubiquitous classism
rejects the idea that people should have a right to live in a neighborhood
they cannot afford.”426 If this is in fact what is occurring in Westchester,
there may be a strong argument that such a settlement is likely to fail.427
B. Advantages of Using Qui Tam
1. Representation of the Parties
Professor Fiss not only commented on the extra caution judges should
use when appraising representatives of “public law” litigants, but he noted
that “public law” litigants tend to be vulnerable and should not be forced to
volunteer as the group’s representative.428 Qui tam allows enforcement of
the HUD grantee’s AFFH duties without the need for an injured party or
group representation.429 The other benefit qui tam provides is that it allows
a group such as the Center, which has the requisite knowledge and
resources to traverse the complicated and overlapping fund granting
mechanisms, regulatory requirements, and case law, to see the case through
until settlement.430

422. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
424. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006).
425. See supra notes 246–251 and accompanying text.
426. Schuck, supra note 66, at 289.
427. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
428. See Fiss, supra note 287, at 20.
429. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (discussing the derivative nature of
the qui tam action).
430. See supra Part I.B–D.
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The procedural rule that allows the United States to intervene at anytime
during the proceeding is an effective mechanism to protect against relators
that do not have the best interests of the community residents in mind.431
The United States even has the opportunity to intervene just prior to
settlement to broker a deal between the relator, the HUD grantee, and the
United States.432 So long as the United States intervenes in appropriate
circumstances, it allows fervent advocates such as the Center to bring
actions against noncompliant grantees such as Westchester, but provides a
safeguard against an opportunistic relator.
2. Solving Structural Problems Within HUD and Municipalities
The qui tam action has the power to effect structural change within the
institutions of HUD and HUD grantees in two ways. First, the prospect of
treble damages pushes the parties toward a settlement.433 The United States
and the Center had the clear advantage—leveraging the potential of a $180
million fine.434 This leverage only increases the relator’s ability to impact
the structure of HUD and HUD grantees. In Anti-Discrimination Center,
Westchester agreed to some fairly extraordinary terms, including to expend
the same amount of money they received while making false certifications
to remedy their noncompliance.435 This only seems fair, but the way in
which Westchester is spending the money is more interesting. Westchester
has agreed to build the vast majority of the affordable homes in highly
concentrated white areas. Even AFFH duties would not require the
stringent requirements included in the settlement.436 This is evidence of
immediate structural change on the part of Westchester County.437
Second, the qui tam suit leads to structural change by providing an
example to other HUD grantees. This mode of structural change is
especially effective in the case of enforcing AFFH through qui tam because
the question of liability under this structure is actually quite straightforward.
The Anti-Discrimination Center litigation provides other HUD grantees
with a simple message: conduct a compliant AI, which includes an analysis
of racial impediments to fair housing, or else you could be liable under the
FCA.
3. Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation
Qui tam has the power to positively impact segregation through the
enforcement of AFFH duties. Enforcement through a flexible grant
program such as CDBG alleviates many of the “command-and-control”
431. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006).
432. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
433. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(1)(G) (describing the liability for
submitting false claims as “a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than
$10,000 . . . plus [three] times the amount of damages which the Government sustains”).
434. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 246–51 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 246–51 and accompanying text.
437. See supra note 286 (defining “structural litigation”).
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concerns recognized by Professor Schuck.438 By way of the second mode
of structural change described above, Anti-Discrimination Center-type
actions set an example for other HUD grantees. This triggers the HUD
grantees to conduct compliant AIs.439 Once the report is produced and the
grantee has in its possession a document that shows substantial racial
segregation, the AFFH duty to do something about the racial impediment is
triggered.440 This all occurs behind the scenes and at all times the grantee
is in control of the specific measures taken. If the community does not act
on these racial impediments, then the grantee is once again open to AntiDiscrimination Center-type liability.441 So long as visibility of the AntiDiscrimination Center action triggers the initial move on the part of the
grantees to conduct a compliant AI, this action has the ability to avoid
“command-and-control” type remedies and quietly modify the behavior of
HUD grantees.442
PART V. QUI TAM IS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACHIEVING CHANGE
The problem of residential segregation is complex. Segregation was
thrust upon current generations by the country’s unfortunate past. Today a
combination of market idiosyncrasies, community resistance, and lax
enforcement of AFFH duties have given residential segregation a seemingly
indefinite life. This Note has explained that the FHA was not designed to
directly combat residential segregation. Furthermore, its sole provision that
allows advocates to edge communities toward integration has been
significantly compromised by the lack of a complimentary enforcement
scheme. Qui tam is the last hope, if one excludes the possibility of an
amendment to the FHA, that would allow parties such as the Center to
directly challenge AFFH violations. The question is, can qui tam be
effective in this context? This Note concludes that the answer is a qualified
yes.
A. Representation of the Parties
The qualification is related to the first issue we will approach. Professor
Fiss eloquently put into words what everyone’s intuition tells them. The
enforcement of civil rights requires representation of the finest class.443
Representation is where the Anti-Discrimination Center-type action has the
potential to go astray. When a civil rights advocacy group such as the
Center brings the action, it can be quite effective. The trouble lies in the
potential for relators other than advocacy groups. A relator that institutes a
suit claiming a HUD grantee has defrauded the government based on AFFH
certifications could forever quash the community’s right to redress. The

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

See supra notes 296–300 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 296–301 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.E.3.
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federal government’s power to intervene is not a sufficient protection.
Housing segregation can be a contentious issue, especially in highly
segregated communities such as Westchester. The Department of Justice
cannot be relied on to uniformly intervene when intervention is needed.
For this reason it is recommended that the FCA be amended to include a
provision requiring the presiding judge to investigate the ability of the
relator to represent affected parties in cases where qui tam is used to
enforce civil rights such as AFFH duties. This would guarantee the
“adequate representation” called for by Professor Fiss.444
B. Solving Structural Problems within HUD and Municipalities
Solving structural problems is where the qui tam action truly shines.
HUD’s lackluster enforcement of the AFFH duties has likely lulled CDBG
grantees to sleep.445 Completing the AI as simply an extra step on the road
to federal dollars is not the correct way to approach the analysis at the heart
of the only desegregation tool. Qui tam brings the AI reports out of the
closet and onto the desk of every HUD grantee that hopes to avoid FCA
liability. There may be more than simply liability at stake. In a sense,
Westchester has been tarnished as the county that stole from the federal
government. Counties similarly situated likely do not want to go through
years of litigation with the potential of being labeled a sophisticated
municipal thief.
The ability of qui tam to impact structural change in the specific agency
that is the subject of the lawsuit itself is certainly diminished by the fact that
the agency can simply opt-out of reforming its practices by settling.
However, for the Westchesters of the world, qui tam is an excellent way to
achieve structural change. The settlement is a testament to how powerful
the treble damages provision is when there is a sufficient level of funding
and a long enough period of fraud.
C. Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation
The concern that the treble damages provision equates to a “commandand-control” approach to the segregation problem is not completely
unwarranted. The Westchester officials’ reaction to the suit early on in the
litigation illustrates that there are strong opinions on both sides of the issue.
However, it is the complexity of the segregation problem that proves to be a
stronger force to be reckoned with. These complexities flow out of the
work of Professor Tiebout446 and Professor Schelling447 and the political
elements described by Professor Schuck.448 In order to counteract these
forces and at least keep pace with the staying power of segregation actions,
mechanisms like the qui tam and advocates such as the Center are essential.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

See supra notes 277–80 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.3 (describing deficiencies in HUD’s enforcement).
See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Note traced the historical roots of residential segregation and
illuminated some characteristics underlying its staying power. Using this as
a backdrop, deficiencies of the FHA were identified and the AntiDiscrimination Center-type action was presented as a potential solution to
the deficiencies. This Note concludes that Anti-Discrimination Center-type
actions have the potential to fill the gap left by the FHA enforcement
mechanism for two interconnected reasons. First, reports garnered through
FOIA requests should be admissible in qui tam suits. Second, although qui
tam is not the perfect tool to enforce civil rights, an amendment to the FCA
would improve Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions by preventing
parasitic relators from disregarding the true victims of segregation. AntiDiscrimination Center should be viewed as a model for future litigants.
This Note concludes that Congress should inquire as to the connection
between the FCA and civil rights enforcement and consider amending the
FCA to ensure sufficient representation of the parties.

